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Automatic Verification Of Linear Controller Software
Abstract
Many safety-critical cyber-physical systems have a software-based controller at their core. Since the system
behavior relies on the operation of the controller, it is imperative to ensure the correctness of the controller to
have a high assurance for such systems. Nowadays, controllers are developed in a model-based fashion.
Controller models are designed, and their performances are analyzed first at the model level. Once the control
design is complete, software implementation is automatically generated from the mathematical model of the
controller by a code generator.
To assure the correctness of the controller implementation, it is necessary to check that the code generation is
correctly done. Commercial code generators are complex black-box software that are generally not formally
verified. Subtle bugs have been found in commercially available code generators that consequently generate
incorrect code. In the absence of verified code generators, it is desirable to verify instances of implementations
against their original models. Such verification is desired to be performed from the input-output perspective
because correct implementations may have different state representations to each other for several possible
reasons (e.g., code generator's choice of state representation, optimization used in code generator and code
transformation).
In this dissertation, we propose several methods to verify a given controller implementation against its given
model from the input-output perspective. First of all, we propose a method to derive assertions from the
controller model, and check if the assertions are invariant to the controller implementation via a proposed
toolchain based on a popular deductive program verification framework. Moreover, we propose an alternative
more scalable method that extracts a model from the controller implementation using the symbolic execution
technique, and compare the extracted model to the original controller model using state-of-the-art constraint
solvers. Lastly, we extend our latter method to correctly account for the rounding errors in the floating-point
computation of the controller implementation. We demonstrate the scalability of our proposed approaches
through evaluation with randomly generated controller specifications of realistic size.
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ABSTRACT
AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION OF LINEAR CONTROLLER
SOFTWARE
Junkil Park
Insup Lee
Oleg Sokolsky
Many safety-critical cyber-physical systems have a software-based controller
at their core. Since the system behavior relies on the operation of the con-
troller, it is imperative to ensure the correctness of the controller to have a
high assurance for such systems. Nowadays, controllers are developed in a
model-based fashion. Controller models are designed, and their performances
are analyzed first at the model level. Once the control design is complete,
software implementation is automatically generated from the mathematical
model of the controller by a code generator.
To assure the correctness of the controller implementation, it is necessary
to check that the code generation is correctly done. Commercial code gener-
ators are complex black-box software that are generally not formally verified.
Subtle bugs have been found in commercially available code generators that
consequently generate incorrect code. In the absence of verified code gen-
erators, it is desirable to verify instances of implementations against their
original models. Such verification is desired to be performed from the input-
output perspective because correct implementations may have different state
representations to each other for several possible reasons (e.g., code genera-
tor’s choice of state representation, optimization used in code generator and
vi
code transformation).
In this dissertation, we propose several methods to verify a given con-
troller implementation against its given model from the input-output per-
spective. First of all, we propose a method to derive assertions from the
controller model, and check if the assertions are invariant to the controller
implementation via a proposed toolchain based on a popular deductive pro-
gram verification framework. Moreover, we propose an alternative more scal-
able method that extracts a model from the controller implementation using
the symbolic execution technique, and compare the extracted model to the
original controller model using state-of-the-art constraint solvers. Lastly, we
extend our latter method to correctly account for the rounding errors in
the floating-point computation of the controller implementation. We demon-
strate the scalability of our proposed approaches through evaluation with
randomly generated controller specifications of realistic size.
vii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Most safety- and life-critical embedded and cyber-physical systems have a
software-based controller at their core. The safety of these systems rely
on the correct operation of the controller. Thus, in order to have a high
assurance for such systems, it is imperative to ensure that controller software
is correctly implemented.
Nowadays, controller software is developed in a model-based fashion, us-
ing industry-standard tools such as Simulink [73] and Stateflow [77]. In this
development process, first of all, the controller model is designed and an-
alyzed. Controller design is performed using a mathematical model of the
control system that captures both the dynamics of the “plant”, the entity
to be controlled, and the controller itself. With this model, analysis is per-
formed to conclude whether the plant model adequately describes the system
to be controlled, and whether the controller achieves the desired goals of the
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control system. Once the control engineer is satisfied with the design, a
software implementation is automatically produced by code generation from
the mathematical model of the controller. Code generation tools such as
Embedded Coder [72] and Simulink Coder [74] are widely used. The gener-
ated controller implementation is either used as it is in the control system, or
sometimes transformed into another code before used for various reasons such
as numerical accuracy improvement [23, 24] and code protection [18, 15, 11].
For simplicity’s sake, we will call code generation even when code generation
is potentially followed by code transformation.
To assure the correctness of the controller implementation, it is necessary
to check that code generation is correctly done. Ideally, we would like to
have verified tools for code generation. In this case, no verification of the
controller implementation would be needed because the tools would guaran-
tee that any produced controller correctly implements its model. In practice,
however, commercial code generators are complex black-box software that
are generally not amenable to formal verification. Subtle bugs have been
found in commercially available code generators that consequently generate
incorrect code [71]. Unverified code transformers may introduce unintended
bugs in the output code.
In the absence of verified code generators, it is desirable to verify instances
of implementations against their original models. Therefore, the goal of this
work is to develop an automatic method to perform such instance verification
for a given controller model and software implementation.
2
1.2 Problem Formulation
This work considers the problem of verifying software implementations of
controllers against controller models as mathematical specifications. We as-
sume that control design activities have been performed, achieving the ac-
ceptable degree of assurance for the control design. Thus, the mathematical
model of the controller is correct with respect to any higher-level require-
ments and can be used as the specification for a software implementation of
the controller.
Controllers are generally specified as a function that, given the current
state of the controller and a set of input sensor values, computes control
output that is sent to the system actuators and the new state of the controller.
We refer to this function as the state-space representation of the controller. In
this work, we focus on linear-time invariant (LTI) controllers, since these are
the most commonly used controllers in control systems. In LTI controllers,
the relationships between the controller input and current state values, and
the computed control output and updated state values are both linear.
In software, controllers are implemented as a subroutine (or a function
in the C language). This function is known as the step function. The step
function is invoked by the control system periodically, or upon arrival of new
sensor data (i.e., measurements).
To properly address this verification problem, the following challenges
should be considered: First of all, such verification should be performed
from the input-output perspective (i.e., input-output conformance). Cor-
rect implementations may have different state representations to each other
for several possible reasons (e.g., code generator’s choice of state represen-
3
tation, optimization used in the code generation process). In other words,
the original controller model and a correct implementation of the model may
be different from each other in state representation, while being functionally
equivalent from the input-output perspective. Thus, it is necessary to develop
the verification technique that is not sensitive to the state representation of
the controller.
Moreover, there is an inherent discrepancy between controller models and
their implementations. The controller software for embedded systems uses a
finite precision arithmetic (e.g., floating-point arithmetic) which introduces
rounding errors in the computation. The effect of these rounding errors needs
to be considered in the verification process. In addition to these rounding
errors, the implementations may be inexact in the numeric representation
of controller parameters due to the potential rounding errors in the code
generation/optimization process. Thus, it is reasonable to allow a tolerance
in the conformance verification as long as the implementation has the same
desired property to the model’s.
Finally, such verification is desired to be automatic and scalable because
verification needs to be followed by each instance of code generation. In the
next section, we describe the contributions of our proposed methods that
address this problem.
1.3 Contributions
At a high level, the goal of this work is to ensure the correctness of controller
implementation instances with respect to their original models in the ab-
4
Controller 
Implementation (Step 
function C Code)
Linear Controller Model
(State-space 
representation, or 
Simulink block diagram)
Linear 
Controller 
Verifier
Verification 
result
(yes/no)Code Generation
Physical System Model
Control Design
Tolerance 
threshold !
Existing Process
Extended Process
artifact
existing process
extended process
Robustness Analysis
Figure 1.1: Our extended proposed process for linear controller verification
sence of verified code generators. Thus, as shown in Figure 1.1, we propose
an extended process building upon the existing model-based development
process. The main new entity in the extended proposed process is Linear
Controller Verifier (LCV), an automatic tool to verify a step function C code
(i.e., controller implementation) against an LTI controller model from the
input-output perspective with tolerance up to a given threshold value .1 To
develop LCV, we explore two alternative approaches in this dissertation: one
is based on invariant checking while another is based on similarity checking.
The more specific contributions that this dissertation make are as follows:
First of all, we propose an invariant checking-based verification method [58].
Given a controller model, this method derives assertions to be satisfied by
1We assume that a threshold value  is given by a control engineer as a result of
robustness analysis that guarantees the desired properties of the control system in the
presence of uncertain disturbances.
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correct step functions. These assertions exactly capture the specification of
the controller, thus the problem of verifying step function is reduced to the
problem of checking whether these assertions are invariant to the step func-
tion or not. These assertions enable the verification of the input-output only
conformance, because they are stated over the input and output variables
only, and no state variables appear in the assertions. In order to do this,
we rely on a different specification of the controller that is insensitive to the
representation of control state. This representation, based on the transfer
function of the controller, relates the current control output to the series
of past control inputs. Moreover, given a tolerance threshold by a control
engineer, we provide a way to relax the invariants (i.e., assertions) of the
controller code in order to tolerate inexact controller parameters up to the
threshold. We demonstrate how the generated control code can be auto-
matically verified with respect to a given transfer function using the popular
deductive software verification framework Frama-C [22], Why3 platform [13],
and the SMT solver Z3 [26].
Secondly, we propose a similarity checking-based verification method [60].
This approach is based on extracting a model from the controller code and
establishing equivalence between the original and the extracted models. This
similarity checking-based method significantly improves the scalability of ver-
ification compared to the invariant checking-based method. The main reason
is that the similarity checking-based method symbolically executes the given
controller code only one time, thus avoiding the loop/execution unrolling that
the invariant checking-based method involves. The first step of the similar-
ity checking-based verification is to extract a model from the given controller
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code using the symbolic execution technique. The symbolic expressions iden-
tified as the result of symbolic execution are used to reconstruct the model
of the controller. Next, the reconstructed model is checked for input-output
equivalence against the given original model, using the well-known neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the equivalence of two minimal LTI models.
We account for the numerical errors of the inexact controller parameters by
allowing for a bounded discrepancy between the models in the equivalence
checking. We provide two ways to automatically check the equivalence based
on an SMT problem formulation and a convex optimization formulation re-
spectively.
Thirdly, building on the work of the similarity checking-based method,
we propose an extended verification approach that correctly accounts for
the floating-point calculation of controller implementation. In this extended
method, we newly introduce error terms into the representation of the ex-
tracted model that characterize the effects of floating-point rounding errors.
We use an optimization formulation to perform approximate equivalence
checking. We demonstrate that this extended approach suffers only min-
imal degradation in performance while offering a higher assurance of the
floating-point controller implementation.
Lastly, we develop LCV, the prototype tool in Figure 1.1 that implements
our verification approaches. The tool accepts a subset of Simulink block
diagrams (i.e., LTI) as input and performs conformance checking against the
given implementations. We demonstrate that the tool are able to detect some
known reproduced bugs of the code generator Embedded Coder [72], and an
unknown bug of the code optimizer Salsa [24].
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1.4 Related Work
This section provides a brief summary of related work, and argues the rea-
son why the current techniques are insufficient in coping with the proposed
problem in this thesis. To ensure the correctness of controller implemen-
tation against the controller model, a typically used method in practice is
equivalence testing (or back-to-back testing) [70, 19, 20] which compares the
outputs of executable model and code for the common input sequence. The
limitation of this testing-based method is that it does not provide a thorough
verification.
Static analysis-based approaches [12, 34, 39] have been used to analyze
the finite-precision numerical controller code, but focuses on checking com-
mon properties such as numerical stability, the absence of buffer overflow or
arithmetic exceptions rather than verifying the code against the model.
The work of [65, 52] proposes translation validation techniques for Simulink
diagrams and the generated codes. The verification relies on the structure of
the block diagram and the code, thus being sensitive to the controller state
while our method verifies code against the model from the input-output per-
spective, not being sensitive to the controller state. Due to optimization and
transformation during a code generation process, a generated code which is
correct may have different state representation than the models. In this case,
our method can verify that the code is correct with respect to the model, but
the state-sensitive methods [65, 52] cannot.
[35, 42, 81, 80] present a control software verification approach based on
the concept of proof-carrying code. In their approach, the code annotation
based on the Lyapunov function and its proof are produced at the time of
8
code generation. The annotation asserts control theory related properties
such as stability and convergence, but not equivalence between controller
specifications and the implementations. In addition, their approach requires
the control of code generator, and may not be applicable to the off-the-shelf
black-box code generators.
There is a line of work that has focused on robust implementations of em-
bedded controllers. For instance, in [66] the authors present a model-based
simulation platform that can be used to analyze controller robustness against
different implementation issues, including sampling, quantization, and fixed-
point arithmetic. [5, 53] present methods for design of robust fixed-point
controllers that guarantee stability and minimize implementation errors, re-
spectively. In [51], the authors introduce a robustness analysis tool that
computes the maximum deviation of the plant states due to measurement
uncertainties. The use of SMT solvers for synthesis of fixed-point embedded
software has been addressed in [25, 33].
Firnally, the authors in [6] present a method for verification of Simulink
models by translating them to Why3 [13] models. Yet, the verification is
again performed only on the model level and not on the code level.
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a background of this dissertation including LTI sys-
tems with motivating examples, and an overview of software verification tech-
niques used in this work.
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Chapter 3 describes an invariant checking-based approach to verify soft-
ware implementations of LTI controllers with respect to their mathematical
specifications by transfer functions. This chapter describe a toolchain de-
veloped to perform such verification, and demonstrate the scalability of the
approach using a set of randomly generated controllers of varying sizes.
Chapter 4 presents a similarity checking-based approach to verify con-
troller implementations by extracting models from the implementations and
comparing the extracted models against the original models. This chapter
also demonstrate the scalability of the prototype tool of this approach.
Chapter 5 presents a method that extends the similarity checking-based
approach of Chapter 4. This extended method correctly accounts for the
rounding errors that would occur in the floating-point computation of the
controller implementation. We demonstrate the scalability of our proposed
approaches through evaluation with randomly generated controller specifica-
tions of realistic size.
Chapter 6 describes LCV, the prototype tool that implements our veri-
fication approaches. This chapter also evaluates the tool LCV through the
case study and the scalability analysis.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation and discuss future research oppor-
tunities.
10
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter presents preliminaries on LTI controllers and their software
implementations. We also introduce two real-world examples that motivate
the problem considered in this thesis, as well as the problem statement.
2.1 Notation and Definitions
We use R to denote the set of reals, while matrix In denotes the n×n identity
matrix. The ith element of vector xk is denoted by xk,i.
1 For vector x, we use
to denote by |x| the vector whose elements are absolute values of the initial
vector. Also, a square matrix A is called nonsingular if its determinant is
not equal to zero.
A discrete system takes a discrete-time signal uk, k ≥ 0, as input and
generates a discrete-time signal yk as output in response to the input. The
system may have a hidden internal state. In this case, the output signal yk
1Note that we use bold letters to denote matrices and vectors (i.e., non-scalars).
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is influenced by not only the input signal uk but also the internal state of
the system at time k. The change of the internal state is influenced by the
input signal uk and the current internal state. A discrete system is said to
be linear if αyk + βyˆk is the output of the system in response to the input
αuk + βuˆk for any scalars α and β when yk and yˆk are the outputs of the
systems in response to the input uk and uˆk respectively. Moreover, a system
is said to be time-invariant if yk−k0 is the output of the system in response
to the input uk−k0 for any k0 when yk is the output of the system in response
to the input uk.
Finally, for discrete-time signal xk, k ≥ 0, the z-transform is a function of
a complex variable defined as X(z) =
∑∞
k=0 xkz
−k. For the signal xk in the
time domain, this z-transform produces a new presentation X(z) in the z-
domain. The z-transform is considered as the discrete analogue of the Laplace
transform [64]. Rational functions are functions that can be represented by
an algebraic fraction where both the numerator and the denominator are
polynomial functions.
2.2 Linear Feedback Controller
The goal of feedback controllers is to ensure that the closed-loop systems have
certain desired behaviors. In general, these controllers derive suitable control
inputs to the plants (i.e., systems to control) based on previously obtained
measurements of the plant outputs. In this thesis, we consider a general class
of feedback controllers that can be specified as linear time-invariant (LTI)
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controllers in the standard state-space representation form:
zk+1 = Azk + Buk
yk = Czk + Duk.
(2.1)
where uk ∈ Rp, yk ∈ Rm and zk ∈ Rn are the input vector, the output
vector and the state vector at time k respectively. The matrices A ∈ Rn×n,
B ∈ Rn×p, C ∈ Rm×n and D ∈ Rm×p together with the initial controller state
z0 completely specify an LTI controller. Thus, we use Σ(A,B,C,D, z0) to
denote an LTI controller, or just use Σ(A,B,C,D) when the initial controller
state z0 is zero.
During the control-design phase, controller Σ(A,B,C,D, z0) is derived
to guarantee the desired closed-loop performance, while taking into account
available computation and communication resources (e.g., finite-precision
arithmetic logic units). This model (i.e., controller specification) is then usu-
ally ‘mapped’ into a software implementation of a step function that: (1)
maintains the state of the controller, and updates it every time new sen-
sor measurements are available (i.e., when it’s invoked); and (2) computes
control outputs (i.e., inputs applied to the plant) from the the current con-
troller’s state and incoming sensor measurements. In most embedded control
systems, the step function is periodically invoked, or whenever new sensor
measurements arrive. In this thesis, we assume that data is exchanged with
the step function through global variables.2 In other words, the input, output
and state variables are declared in the global scope, and the step function
2This convention is used by Embedded Coder, a code generation toolbox for Mat-
lab/Simulink.
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reads both input and state variables, and updates both output and state
variables as the effect of its execution. It is worth noting however that this
assumption does not critically limit our approach because it can be easily
extended to support a different code interface for the step function.
2.3 Motivating Examples
To motivate our work, we introduce two examples, which illustrate limita-
tions of the standard verification techniques that directly utilize the mathe-
matical model from (6.1), in cases when controller software is generated by a
code generator whose optimizations potentially violate the model while still
ensuring the desired control functionality.
2.3.1 A Scalar Linear Integrator
Consider a simple controller that computes control input yk as a scaled sum
of all previous sensor data ui ∈ R, i = 0, ..., k − 1 – i.e.,
yk =
k−1∑
i=0
αui, k > 1, and, y0 = 0. (2.2)
Now, if we use the Simulink Integrator block with Forward Euler in-
tegration to implement this controller, the resulting controller model will
be Σ(1, α, 1, 0), – i.e., zk+1 = zk + αuk, yk = zk. On the other hand, a real-
ization Σˆ(1, 1, α, 0) – i.e., zk+1 = zk + uk, yk = αzk, of the controller would
introduce a reduced computational error when finite precision arithmetics is
used [25]. Thus, controller specification (3.7) may result in two different soft-
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ware implementations due to the use of different code generation tools. Still,
it is important to highlight that these two implementations would have iden-
tical input-output behavior – the only difference is whether they maintain a
scaled or unscaled sum of the previous sensor measurements.
2.3.2 Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output Controllers
Now, consider a more general Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) con-
troller with two inputs and two outputs which maintains five states
zk+1 =

−0.500311 0.16751 0.028029 −0.395599 −0.652079
0.850942 0.181639 −0.29276 0.481277 0.638183
−0.458583 −0.002389 −0.154281 −0.578708 −0.769495
1.01855 0.638926 −0.668256 −0.258506 0.119959
0.100383 −0.432501 0.122727 0.82634 0.892296

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
zk+
+

1.1149 0.164423
−1.56592 0.634384
1.04856 −0.196914
1.96066 3.11571
−3.02046 −1.96087

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
uk (2.3)
yk =
 0.283441 0.032612 −0.75658 0.085468 0.161088
−0.528786 0.050734 −0.681773 −0.432334 −1.17988

︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
zk
(2.4)
15
The controller has to perform 25 + 10 = 35 multiplications as part of the
state z update in every invocation of the step function. On the other hand,
the following controller requires only 5 + 10 = 15 multiplications for state
update.
zˆk+1 =

0.87224 0 0 0 0
0 0.366378 0 0 0
0 0 −0.540795 0 0
0 0 0 −0.332664 0
0 0 0 0 −0.204322

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Aˆ
zˆk+
+

0.822174 −0.438008
−0.278536 −0.824313
0.874484 0.858857
−0.117628 −0.506362
−0.955459 −0.622498

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bˆ
uk, (2.5)
yk =
 −0.793176 0.154365 −0.377883 −0.360608 −0.142123
0.503767 −0.573538 0.170245 −0.583312 −0.56603

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cˆ
zˆk
(2.6)
The above controllers Σ and Σˆ are similar, which means that the same
input sequences yk delivered to both controllers, would result in identical
outputs of the controllers. Note that the controller’s states will likely dif-
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fer. Consequently, the ‘diagonalized’ controller Σˆ results in the same control
performance and thus provides the same control functionality as Σ, while
violating the state evolution model of the initial controller Σ. The moti-
vation for the use of the diagonalized controller comes from a significantly
reduced computational cost that allow for the utilization of resource con-
strained embedded platforms. In general, any controller (6.1), would require
n2 + np = n(n + p) multiplications to update its state. This can be sig-
nificantly reduced when matrix A in (6.1) is diagonal – in this case only
n+ np = n(p+ 1) multiplications are needed.
2.4 Software Verification Techniques
This section briefly overviews the software verification techniques such as
deductive verification, symbolic execution and model extraction.
2.4.1 Deductive Verification
Deductive verification [36] is a deductive approach to verify a program, which
normally consists of two steps: (1) turning the correctness of a program into
a mathematical statement (also known as verification condition), and then
(2) proving the statement. The correctness of a program is defined by a
specification of the program. A specification can be given using the concept
of Hoare triple [43]. A Hoare triple is the form {P}s{Q} where P is a pre-
condition, s is a program statement, and Q is a postcondition. A program
statement s is said to be correct with respect to some given precondition P
and postcondition Q when the Hoare triple {P}s{Q} is valid. The Hoare
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triple {P}s{Q} is valid if the execution of s starting from any state that
satisfies P finishes in a state that satisfies Q. Note that if s is not termi-
nating, it is correct for any P and Q. In this regard, the validity of a Hoare
triple asserts the partial correctness of a program. An additional require-
ment for s to be terminating defines total correctness. One can establish
the validity of a Hoare triple using the Hoare rules with providing proper
intermediate assertions. However, this typically requires much manual effort
in practice. Thus, most modern verification condition generators use the
weakest precondition calculation which computes the weakest precondition
wp(s,Q) for some given program statement s and postcondition Q such that
{wp(s,Q)}s{Q}. Consequently, the validity of the Hoare triple {P}s{Q}
is equivalent to P =⇒ wp(s,Q). Generated verification conditions can
be discharged by the support of tools such as SMT solvers (e.g., Z3 [26],
CVC4 [8]) and interactive theorem provers (e.g., Coq [7], PVS [57]), possibly
being coordinated by a multi-prover deductive verification framework [37].
Finally, Frama-C [22] and ACSL [10] have been widely used for software
verification. For example, for verification of a subset of the standard C
library [16], safety-critical software in the railway domain [41], and the Xen
kernel [63]). In addition, [28, 48] present methods for dynamic analysis in
Frama-C, and in [42] the authors present the use of Frama-C for verification
of control software.
2.4.2 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution [47] [17] is a program analysis technique which executes a
program in a symbolic manner to explore multiple different execution paths.
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Symbolic execution contrasts with concrete execution. Concrete execution
for program analysis can be said to be program testing, which process is as
follows: concrete values are given as an input to a program under test. The
program is executed for the concrete inputs, and the observable behavior
(e.g., output) of the execution is inspected to see if it is expected or not.
In this process, a concrete execution yields a single execution path. In most
cases, concrete executions only cover a small subset of the whole input space,
and thus may miss the program executions which actually lead to errors.
On the other hand, symbolic execution allows a program to take as in-
put symbolic values instead of concrete values. A symbolic value (e.g., α,
β) denotes an arbitrary concrete value. For a given symbolic input, a sym-
bolic execution engine explores the control flow paths of the program while
maintaining (1) a symbolic program state which maps variables to symbolic
expressions, and (2) a path condition which is a constraint on the symbolic
input values and characterizes the path currently being explored. In other
words, a path condition is the conjunction of the conditions of the branches
taken along the path. During a symbolic execution, branch statements up-
date the path condition, while assignment statements update the symbolic
program state.
Symbolic execution can be used in program analysis in many different
ways. First of all, symbolic execution can be used to generate test cases that
covers certain execution paths. Suppose that there is an execution path with
path condition C. The feasibility of the path is reduced to the satisfiability
of the path condition C. Constraint solvers (e.g., Z3 [26] and CVC4 [8]) are
used to automatically find an assignment which satisfies C, which can serve
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as a concrete input (i.e., test case) that covers the path. Moreover, symbolic
execution can be used to verify assertions in programs. Suppose that the path
with the path condition C reaches an assertion statement which asserts the
predicate P . If (C =⇒ P ) is valid, it is guaranteed that all concrete input
values that lead to the path (i.e., satisfies C) are not violating the assertion
P . Checking the validity of the formula can also be done automatically
by constraint solvers. If the formula is not valid, the solvers also provide
a concrete assignment (i.e., concrete input value) that causes the assertion
violation.
2.4.3 Model Extraction
The model extraction technique has been used in software verification [78,
21, 45, 46, 54, 79, 62, 67]. There is a line of work that has focused on
using the model extraction technique for software model checking [78, 21,
45, 46, 54]. From a given source program, these model extraction tools
automatically extract a verification model in the input language of several
existing model checkers such as SPIN [44], SMV [55], SAL [27] and Zing [4].
Bandera [21] takes Java programs, and extracts models from the programs
in a certain intermediate representation which are further translated into the
input languages of existing model checkers such as SPIN, SMV and SAL.
Modex [45, 46] extract the control-flow skeleton of a given C program in
the Promela language [44] to verify the message passing operations of the
program using the SPIN model checker. The work [54] focuses on extracting
verification models from C programs of Windows kernel drivers to facilitate
software model checking using the Zing model checker.
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There is also much work on extracting high-level state machine models
from source programs [49, 69, 79, 67]. These approaches reconstruct a state
machine model from a given program for the use of program testing and
code review (i.e., visualizing the state machine model for a programmer to
understand the high-level perspective of the behavior of the legacy program).
For model extraction, the symbolic execution technique is used in [49, 79, 67]
while the work [69] analyze the structure of the abstract syntax tree of the
program.
Finally, the work [62] applies the symbolic execution technique to im-
plemented source code to extract mathematical functional models. The ap-
proach only considers a restricted set of programs that can be represented as
pure mathematical functions (i.e., without having states), thus being unable
to account for persistent static variables such as global variables which are
essential to represent the state of controllers in controller implementations.
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Chapter 3
Invariant Checking-based
Verification Approach
This chapter describe an invariant checking-based verification method [58].
Given a controller model, this method derives assertions to be satisfied by
correct step functions. These assertions exactly capture the specification of
the controller, thus the step function verification problem is reduced to the
problem of checking whether these assertions are invariant to the step func-
tion or not. In order to derive invariants that assert the input-output only
conformance of code against model, we rely on a different specification of the
controller that is insensitive to the representation of control state. This repre-
sentation, based on the transfer function of the controller, relates the current
control output to the series of past control inputs. The number of past inputs
needed to capture the transfer function is known as the degree of the con-
troller. It is well known that every state-space representation of a controller
can be transformed into a transfer function, and that equivalent (i.e., simi-
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lar) state-space representations will have the same transfer function [64]. In
this chapter, we demonstrate how the generated control code can be auto-
matically verified with respect to a given transfer function using the popular
software verification framework Frama-C [22], Why3 platform [13], and the
SMT solver Z3 [26].
Verification is currently performed in the domain of real numbers, disre-
garding numerical errors due to floating point calculations in the software.
We are planning to address the floating point domain in our future work.
As the first step towards the full treatment of the problem, we consider im-
precise implementations of the controller and allow coefficients of its transfer
function to deviate from the specification, up to a fixed bound. We show
that, while these bounded-error specifications can be handled using the same
tool chain as exact specifications, they yield SMT problems with a differ-
ent structure, which adversely affect scalability of the solution. We then
propose an alternative, equivalent specification for the controller, which we
call an instantiation-based specification. We show that by slightly increasing
the size of the specification, we can dramatically improve the scalability of
verification.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 introduces invariants
for linear controllers and methods for code annotation, for both exact and
inexact controller implementations. In Sec. 3.2, we define instantiation-based
invariants for linear controllers. Finally, in Sec. 3.3, we present the developed
framework for automatic control code verification and evaluation results.
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3.1 Defining Invariants for Linear Controllers
In this section, we introduce invariants for linear controllers that can be used
to verify both state and input-output conformance of the obtained code or
only input-output conformance of the code. By the input-output conformance
we refer to the requirement that in response to provided inputs the code
provides outputs equal to the outputs provided by the model in (6.1) for the
same input signals. Additionally, by state and input-output conformance we
refer to the requirement that in response to provided inputs the code fully
conforms to the initial model in (6.1) – i.e., not only in output but also in
the internal state of the controller.
Accordingly, for verification of state and input-output (IO) conformance,
invariants can be directly obtained from the model in (6.1). On the other
hand, as illustrated in the previous section, there is a need to provide a
method to capture input-output (IO) only invariants for linear controllers.
These invariants cannot utilize any assertions on the controller’s state, be-
cause controller implementations may be equivalent from the input-output
perspective and yet rely on different state representations.
3.1.1 Input-Output Invariants
We consider a controller defined as Σ = (A,B,C,D). The controller’s trans-
fer function G(z), defined as G(z) = Y(z)
U(z)
where U(z) and Y(z) denote the
z-transforms of the signals uk and yk respectively, is a convenient way to
capture the dependency between the controller’s input and output signals.
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For the controller Σ we have that
G(z) = C(zIn −A)−1B + D. (3.1)
In general, G(z) is a m × p matrix with each element Gi,j(z) being a ra-
tional function of the complex variable z. To simplify the notation, unless
otherwise noted, we will assume that the considered controller is a Single-
Input-Single-Output (SISO) controller, meaning that the transfer function
G(z) is a (single, not a matrix) rational function of z. The introduced in-
variants can be easily extended to Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO)
controllers.
From (3.1), in the general case G(z) takes the form
G(z) =
β0 + β1z
−1 + · · ·+ βnz−n
1 + α1z−1 + · · ·+ αnz−n , (3.2)
where n is the size of the initial controller model, and we will also refer to n
as the degree of the transfer function. In addition, β0, ..., βn, α1, ..., αn ∈ R
and can be obtained as in (3.1), from the parameters of the initial controller
specification (6.1). Therefore, the transfer function is fully described by
the vectors α, β ∈ Rn+1 that are defined as α = [1, α1, ..., αn] and β =
[β0, β1, ..., βn].
From the properties of the z-transforms such as linearity and time-invariance,
the above equation implies that the controller’s input and output signals sat-
isfy the following difference equation [64]:
yk =
n∑
i=0
βiuk−i −
n∑
i=1
αiyk−i, (3.3)
25
with yk = 0, k < 0, because z0 = 0 and uk = 0, for k < 0. The coefficients
α and β of this equation come from (3.2). Thus, for any controller Σ it
is possible to obtain a linear invariant of the form in (3.3) that specifies
the relationship between controller inputs and outputs. In addition, since
transfer functions are invariant to similarity transformations [64], besides the
controller Σ, the linear invariant in (3.3) is also satisfied by any controller
Σˆ obtained from the initial controller model Σ using a similarity transform
with a nonsingular matrix T.
3.1.2 Annotating Controller Invariants in C Code
The linear conditions in (6.1) and (3.3) respectively capture the expected
state and input-output, and input-output only invariants for LTI controllers.
The next challenge is to find a suitable method to express them as C code
annotations, compatible with existing verification tools. To achieve this goal,
we exploit ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (ACSL) [10] that enables
users to specify desired properties of C code within the program’s comments.
ACSL is integrated in the Frama-C platform [22] that supports tools for
reasoning about correctness of C code and incorporated ACSL annotations.
To illustrate the use of ACSL to capture C code invariants, as a running
example we use the following Σ(A,B,C,0) controller
A =
0.8147 1.1534
2.6413 3.6411
 ,B =
3.1019
2.1432
 ,C = [1.7121 0.1351] (3.4)
G(z) =
5.60030931z−1 − 14.233777166248z−2
1− 4.4558z−1 − 0.08007125z−2 (3.5)
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For completeness, we first introduce annotations that capture both IO and
state conformance, before introducing IO only annotations.
3.1.3 Annotating Input-Output and State Invariants
To capture the input-output and state requirements for a C function, we ex-
ploit the ACSL’s notion of the function contract, which is effectively a Hoare
triple [43, 30] for the entire function. ACSL utilizes the keywords requires
and ensures to specify the preconditions and postconditions; the verification
goal is to prove that postconditions are satisfied upon return if preconditions
were satisfied when the function call occurred. The precondition for the con-
troller’s step function is that all pointers to memory locations are valid –
for example, valid pointers to state vectors and matrix coefficients if the co-
efficients are not directly instantiated. This requirement is supported by the
predicate valid that is part of ACSL.
On the other hand, the specified postconditions follow directly from the
linear invariants (i.e., the model) of the controller step function in (6.1).
To capture them and properly annotate the code, we exploit the built-in
ACSL predicate old that denotes the values of a variable before the code
is executed. For instance, for the considered controller defined in (3.4), the
controller code with the annotations is presented in Listing 1.
3.1.4 Annotating Input-Output Only Invariants
Unlike the state and IO invariants, the IO only controller invariants from (3.3)
cannot be specified using pre- and post-conditions for every execution of the
step function. This is caused by the fact that constraint (3.3) effectively
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double x[2], u, y;
/*@ requires \valid(x+(0..1));
@ ensures x[0] == 0.8147*\old(x[0]) +
@ 1.1534*\old(x[1]) + 3.10191*\old(u);
@ ensures x[1] == 2.6413*\old(x[0]) +
@ 3.6411*\old(x[1]) + 2.1432*\old(u);
@ ensures y == 1.7121*\old(x[0]) +
@ 0.1351*\old(x[1]) + 0*\old(u);
*/
void step() {
double t1, t2;
y = 1.7121*x[0] + 0.1351*x[1];
t1 = 0.8147*x[0] + 1.1534*x[1] + 3.1019*u;
t2 = 2.6413*x[0] + 3.6411*x[1] + 2.1432*u;
x[0] = t1;
x[1] = t2;
}
Listing 1: Verified code for the Σ controller from (3.4) annotated by the state
and input-output invariant
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relates the last n+1 executions of the step function. Therefore, to verify IO
conformance of the controller code we have to perform execution unrolling of
the step function a certain number of times. To achieve this, we construct
the function verif driver that invokes the step function exactly n+1 times.
It is important to note here that the number of times the code needs to be
unrolled is equal to the size of the initial controller model (i.e., the degree of
transfer function) increased by 1. Finally, by using a separate label for every
step function execution, we can then exploit the built-in ACSL keyword at
to capture the values of input and output variables at each point of time
(i.e., execution of the ‘unrolled’ function).
ACSL supports assertions at the end of any C code block using the assert
keyword, where assert p specifies that p has to hold in the current state
(i.e., at the place where the assertion occurs) [10]. Thus, the invariant (3.3)
can be specified as1
/*@ assert \at(y,kn) + α1*\at(y,kn−1)+...
@ αn*\at(y,k0) == β0*\at(u,kn) +...
@ βn*\at(u,k0) */
(3.6)
For instance, for controller Σ specified as in (3.4), Listing 2 presents the
verif driver function with the corresponding annotations.
1If the step function could change the input variables, we would have to introduce
separate labels for inputs and outputs (instead of a single set of k0 to kn points). However,
to simplify the notation (and since we verify that the step function does not modify input
variables) we use a single set of labels.
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extern double input();
void verif_driver() {
u = input(); step();
k0:;
u = input(); step();
k1:;
u = input(); step();
k2:;
/*@assert \at(y,k2) - 4.4558*\at(y, k1)
@ - 0.08007125*\at(y, k0)
@ == 5.60030931*\at(u, k1)
@ - 14.233777166248*\at(u, k0);
@ */
}
Listing 2: Annotated code for verification of the IO only conformance of the
Σ controller from (3.4)
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3.1.5 Inexact Controller Implementations
Let us revisit the example controller with the initial model defined in (3.4).
We obtained a computationally more efficient controller Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ,0) via a
similarity transformation from the initial controller Σ; this was done in Mat-
lab using the function canon for the modal type of decomposition, resulting
in controller Σˆ:
Aˆ =
−0.0179 0
0 4.474
 , Bˆ =
−1.051
−1.055
 , Cˆ = [−3.037 −2.283] (3.7)
ˆG(z) =
5.600452z−1 − 14.2373891245z−2
1− 4.4561z−1 − 0.0800846z−2 (3.8)
There exists a discrepancy between transfer functions G(z) in (3.5) and
Gˆ(z) in (3.8), which implies that that the previously introduced input-output
invariant from (3.3) will not be satisfied by the control code implementing
controller Σˆ. Although a similarity transform results in a new controller
with the same transfer function, due to finite-precision computation of the
code generator performing controller optimization (in this case Matlab), it is
possible (and expected) that the transfer function of the produced controller
slightly differs from the transfer function of the initial controller.
Consequently, there is a need to extend our input-output invariants for
the case with imprecise specification of the transfer functions. Specifically,
we extend (3.2) by assuming that the transfer function could take the form
as
G(z) =
βˆ0 + βˆ1z
−1 + · · ·+ βˆnz−n
1 + αˆ1z−1 + · · ·+ αˆnz−n , (3.9)
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such that for i = 0, 1, ..., n
βi − β ≤ βˆi ≤ βi + β, αi − α ≤ αˆi ≤ αi + α. (3.10)
Here, β and α denote the bounds on the errors of the transfer function
coefficients. We assume that these are inputs to our verification procedure;
suitable error bounds that guarantee the desired control performance can be
extracted using methods from robust control theory [31].
Yet, these inaccuracies also affect the input-output controller invariants
that now need to be (re)stated. We start by noting that from (3.9) it holds
that
∃∆βi,∆αi ∈ R, i = 0, ..., n, |∆βi| ≤ β ∧ |∆αi| ≤ α∧
yk =
n∑
i=0
(βi + ∆βi)uk−i −
n∑
i=1
(αi + ∆αi)yk−i.
(3.11)
However, the above condition is not linear, but rather bilinear, as it con-
tains products ∆βiuk−i and ∆αiyk−i. Hence, we introduce additional vari-
ables u˜k−i = ∆βiuk−i and y˜k−i = ∆αiyk−i and restate (3.11) as follows
∃u˜k−i, y˜k−i ∈ R, i = 0, 1, ..., n,
|u˜k−i| ≤ β|uk−i| ∧ |y˜k−i| ≤ α|yk−i| ∧
yk =
n∑
i=0
(βiuk−i + u˜k−i)−
n∑
i=1
(αiyk−i + y˜k−i)
(3.12)
Since α ≥ 0, the condition |y˜i| ≤ α|ui| is equivalent to
((−αyi ≤ y˜i ≤ αyi) ∧ (yi ≥ 0)) ∨ ((αyi ≤ y˜i ≤ −αyi) ∧ (yi ≤ 0)).
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A similar term can be obtained for |u˜i| ≤ β|ui|. Thus, we introduce a pred-
icate error bound(a,b,c) as
#define error bound(a,b,c) (((b)>=0 && -(b)*(c) <= (a) <= (b)*(c))
|| ((b)<0 && (b)*(c) <= (a) <= -(b)*(c)))
With the above notation, and using the ACSL keyword exists for the
existential quantifier, the input-output invariant (3.12) can be annotated in
code as follows:
/*@ assert \exists real y˜0, ..., y˜n−1, u˜0, ..., u˜n
@ error bound(y˜0,\at(y,k0),α) && ... &&
@ error bound(y˜n−1,\at(y,kn−1),α) &&
@ error bound(u˜0,\at(u,k0),β) && ... &&
@ error bound(u˜n,\at(u,kn),β) &&
@ (\at(y,kn)+α1*\at(y,kn−1)+y˜n−1+...+αn*\at(y,k0)+y˜0
@ == β0*\at(u,kn)+u˜n+...+βn*\at(u,k0)+u˜0) */
(3.13)
For example, for the controller Σ specified (3.4), Listing 3 illustrates the
verif driver function with the input-output invariant annotations that al-
low for transfer function inaccuracies.
It is important to highlight that the IO invariant in (3.12) and the corre-
sponding code annotation in (3.13) exploit a mixture of both universal and
existential quantifiers. Existential quantifiers are used to specify tolerance
variables y˜ and u˜, while universal quantifiers are employed since (3.12) has
to hold for all values of uk at points k0, ... kn and yk at k0, ... kn−1 (where
label k0 does not have to correspond to any time-step k). Note that the use
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of formulas with both universal and existential quantifiers usually presents
a challenge for SMT solvers (e.g., Z3), which, as we will illustrate in the
evaluation section later (Section 3.3.1), significantly limits scalability of the
approach and degrees of controllers that can be verified using the invariant.
We address this problem in the next section as we provide another approach
to derive input-output invariants for LTI controllers.
3.2 Instantiation-based Input-Output Invari-
ants for LTI Controllers
In this section, we present an alternative method to specify linear invariants
that are equivalent to the IO invariant introduced in (3.3), (3.12) and (3.13).
As we will show, the method is better suited to capture robust invariants
that allow for slightly inexact controller implementations, as in cases when
there exists a small discrepancy between the transfer function of the initial
controller and the one implemented by the provided code.
Initially, we consider the exact input-output invariants from (3.3), and we
start by logically ‘unrolling’ the condition (3.3) N times – by summarizing N
executions of the controller from (3.3) using the matrices introduced below.
Definition. Consider controller Σ. For the controller’s inputs and outputs
uk and yk at time steps k = 0, 1, ..., n + N − 1, we define the matrix DN =
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extern double input();
void verif_driver() {
u = input(); step();
k0:;
u = input(); step();
k1:;
u = input(); step();
k2:;
/*@assert \exists real yt0, yt1, ut0, ut1;
@ error_bound(yt0, \at(y, k0), 0.01) &&
@ error_bound(yt1, \at(y, k1), 0.01) &&
@ error_bound(ut0, \at(u, k0), 0.01) &&
@ error_bound(ut1, \at(u, k1), 0.01) &&
@ \at(y,k2)
@ - 4.4558*\at(y, k1) + yt1
@ - 0.08007125*\at(y, k0) + yt0
@ == 5.60030931*\at(u, k1) + ut1
@ - 14.233777166248*\at(u, k0) + ut0;
@ */
}
Listing 3: Annotated code for verification of the IO conformance within the
tolerance limit for the example controller from (3.4); Note that y˜ and u˜
from (3.13) are denoted by yt and ut
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[
DyN D
u
N
]
where
DyN =

yn yn−1 ... y1 y0
yn+1 yn ... y2 y1
...
...
. . .
...
...
yn+N−1 yn+N−1 ... yN yN−1
 (3.14)
DuN =

un un−1 ... u1 u0
un+1 un ... u2 u1
...
...
. . .
...
...
un+N−1 un+N−2 ... uN uN−1
 (3.15)
Consequently, from (3.3) and the above definition it follows that
DN · θ = 0, (3.16)
where θ =
[
1 α1 ... αn β0 β1 ... βn
]T
=
[
αT βT
]T
captures all of
the parameters of the controller’s transfer function.
The following proposition shows that under certain conditions, linear
equalities from (3.16) are equivalent to the invariant in (3.3) obtained from
the controller’s transfer function.
Proposition 1. Consider LTI controller Σ of size n. Then the rank of any
matrix DN cannot be larger than 2n+ 1. Furthermore, when the rank of DN
is 2n + 1, then linear conditions from (3.16) are satisfied if and only if the
condition (3.3) is satisfied for all k.
Proof. From Definition 3.2, rank(DN) ≤ 2n+ 2, for any N ≥ 1, because the
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matrix has 2n+ 2 columns. Note that the matrix cannot have rank 2n+ 2 as
that would imply that the columns of DN are linearly independent and thus
their linear combination DyN · θ could be equal to the zero vector only if all
elements of θ are zero (i.e., θ = 0). This is clearly not possible since 1 is the
first element of θ.
Now suppose that rank(DN) = 2n + 1. As we argued before, from (3.3)
and Definition 3.2 we have that (3.16) is satisfied. Thus, let’s consider the
other direction.
We start by assuming that (3.16) holds for a vector θ obtained from some
vectors α and β. Since Σ is an LTI controller of size n then, as presented in
Section 3.1, there exist vectors αˆ, βˆ, and θˆ =
[
αˆT βˆT
]T
for which (3.3) is
satisfied for each k. Therefore, since DN captures inputs and outputs of the
system (from its definition), we have that
DN · θˆ = 0 = DN · θ ⇒ DN · (θ − θˆ) = 0. (3.17)
Note that since the first element of θ−θˆ is zero, DN ·(θ−θˆ) presents linear
combination of all columns of DN except the first one. Thus, from (3.17), if
θ 6= θˆ it follows that the remaining 2n + 1 columns of DN (i.e., without the
first column) are linearly dependent. On the other hand, the first column of
DN presents a linear combination of other columns with coefficients from θˆ.
Thus, since the rank of DN is 2n + 1, we have that the remaining 2n + 1
columns are linearly independent, which contradicts are previous conclusion.
Thus, we have that θ = θˆ, meaning that if (3.16) holds so does (3.3), which
concludes the proof.
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The specific structure of matrix DN (the matrices with structure such
as DyN and D
u
N are called Toeplitz matrices) makes it suitable to obtain the
rank of DN equal to 2n + 1 with exactly N = 2n + 1 rows. To generate
matrix D2n+1 with rank 2n+ 1, we start by assigning yk = 0 and uk = 0 for
all k = 0, ..., n − 1, and then un = 1. After this, the only assignments are
done on uk, k > n, as the values for yk, k > n are derived from the initial
controller model (i.e., specification). Specifically, after assigning un = 1, we
set the next n− 1 inputs to zero. Since n is the size of the initial controller
(which is minimal by our assumption), the corresponding first n rows of both
Dy and Du will be linearly independent. Finally, the last n+1 inputs uk, k =
2n, ..., 3n, are assigned in a way that ensures that each newly introduced row
is linearly independent of the previous ones – this is easy to achieve due to
the fact that inputs uk, k = n+ 1, ..., 2n− 1 were all zero.
The above proposition allows us to specify a set of 2n+1 linear invariants,
which if satisfied would verify input-output conformance of the considered
controller code – i.e., the invariant in (3.3). At first glance, the benefits of
using the invariant with 2n+ 1 linear conditions might be unclear, when an
invariant with a single linear condition can be used. However, as we discussed
at the end of the previous section, the invariant in (3.3) and its corresponding
ACSL annotation (3.6) require that for all values of u at points k0 ... kn and y
at k0 ... kn−1, the value of y at kn is equal to the specified linear combination
of uk’s and yk’s. On the other hand, the invariant (3.16) does not use the
universal quantifier; rather, it specifies that if values of uk at 3n + 1 points
are equal to the corresponding values from Du2n+1 and the values of yk at
the first n points are equal to the corresponding values from Dy2n+1, then the
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values of yk at the remaining 2n+ 1 points have to be equal to the remaining
values from the matrix Dy2n+1.
Finally, the above method for deriving a set of linear invariants exploits
a similar approach as the ones used in testing for system identification. By
creating a suitable matrix D2n+1 we effectively provide a set of controller
inputs at consecutive executions of the step function and verify whether
the controller outputs conform to the prespecified input-output behavior of
the controller. Hence, we refer to the linear invariants specified in (3.16) as
instantiation-based invariants.
3.2.1 Defining Instantiation-Based Invariants as Code
Annotation
Similarly to the IO controller invariants from (3.3), to introduce instantiation-
based invariants as code annotations we have to perform execution unrolling
of the step function within a newly defined verif driver function. Due
to the fact that the matrix D2n+1 contains controller inputs and outputs
for steps 0 to 3n, we need to unroll the function exactly 3n + 1 times and
introduce a separate label ki, i = 0, ..., 3n for each step function execu-
tion, as previously presented in Listing 3. With this notation, the invariant
from (3.16) can be captured as the code annotation from (3.18), where ui and
yi, i = 0, 1, ..., 3n, specify the corresponding elements of the matrix D2n+1 as
stated in Definition 3.2.
Another approach to define instantiation-based invariants is to directly
perform input variables assignments in verif driver code, as presented in
Listing 4. This effectively reduces the complexity of the assert statement,
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/*@ assert ((\at(y,k0)==y0)&&...&&(\at(y,kn−1)==yn−1) &&
@ (\at(u,k0)==u0 )&&...&&(\at(u,k3n)==u3n))
@ ⇒ ((\at(y,kn) == yn) && ... && (\at(y,k3n)==y3n)) */
(3.18)
/*@ assert ((\at(y,k0)==y0)&&...&&(\at(y,kn−1)==yn−1)) ⇒
@ ((\at(y,kn)==yn)&&...&&(\at(y,k3n)==y3n)) */
(3.19)
whose form is shown in (3.19). In Section 3.3.1, we will compare efficiency
of these approaches.
Remark. The above annotations can be significantly simplified if we know
the variables in the code used to maintain the controller’s state (for example,
this can be determined with the use of static analysis tools). As previously
described, the matrix D2n+1 is designed in a way that uk = 0 and yk = 0 for
k = 0, ..., n − 1. For linear systems with minimal realizations (which means
that they are controllable and observable [64]) this would also imply that the
state of the controller at time n − 1 would have to be zero (i.e., zn−1 = 0).
Thus, in this case, we would need to unroll code execution only 2n+1 times
(and introduce only 2n + 1 points/labels) by either specifying zn−1 == 0 as
part of the assert statement similar to what is done in (3.18), or introduce
an additional assignment zn−1 = 0 in the verify driver function with an
assert statement similar to the one in (3.19).
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extern double input();
void verif_driver() {
u = u_0; step();
k0:;
u = u_1; step();
k1:;
.
.
u = u_3n; step();
k3n:;
/*@assert ... ( from (24) ) @ */
}
Listing 4: One structure of the code annotations for verification of the IO
only conformance using the Instantiation-based Invariants from (3.16); Note
that u t denotes ut from the matrix D2n+1
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3.2.2 Instantiation-Based Invariants for Inexact Con-
troller Implementations
The invariant introduced in (3.16) can be especially important for verifica-
tion of inexact controller implementations that allow for small errors in the
coefficients of the implemented controllers’ transfer functions. To elaborate
on this, let’s use the same notation as in Section 3.1.5 and let’s assume that
transfer function can be specified using the vector θˆ =
[
αˆT βˆT
]T
, where
αˆ, βˆ satisfy (3.10). Thus, from (3.16) we have that D2n+1 · θˆ = 0 which is (as
in Proposition 1) equivalent to the invariant in (3.11).
Now, by introducing ∆θ = θˆ − θ, we have that
D2n+1 · θ + D2n+1 ·∆θ = 0. (3.20)
Since the matrix D2n+1 and the initial transfer function vectors α and β are
known, from the initial controller model, we can compute
v = −Dy2n+1α−Du2n+1β.
Using the vector v, we can state the following invariant
∃∆βi,∆αi ∈ R, i = 0, ..., n, |∆βi| ≤ β ∧ |∆αi| ≤ α ∧
Dy2n+1∆α + D
u
2n+1∆β = v ∧
yn+i =D
y
2n+1(n+ i), i = 0, ..., 2n,
(3.21)
where Dy2n+1(k) denotes the entry in the matrix D
y
2n+1 on the position corre-
sponding to yk as defined in (3.14) (for the exact controller specification).
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/*@ assert \exists real a0, ..., an−1, b0, ..., bn
@ (a0 ≤ α)&&(a0 ≥ −α)&&...&&(an−1 ≤ α)&&(an−1 ≥ −α)&&
@ (b0 ≤ β)&&(b0 ≥ −β)&&...&&(bn ≤ β)&&(bn ≥ −β) &&
@ ((\at(y,k0)==y0) &&...&& (\at(y,kn−1)==yn−1) &&
@ (\at(u,k0) ==u0) &&...&& (\at(u,k3n)==u3n))
@ ⇒ ((\at(y,kn) == yn) &&...&& (\at(y,k3n)==y3n) &&
@ vector equal((lin comb(Dy, 1, a0, ..., an−1) +
@ lin comb(Du, b0, ..., bn)),v) ) */
(3.22)
Figure 3.1: The verification toolchain of the invariant checking-based ap-
proach.
The above invariant is linear and utilizes only the existential quantifier.
Again, as in the case for the exact IO invariant, we can define two types
of instantiation-based invariants for inexact controller implementations. For
instance, the assert statement similar to the one in (3.18), for exact controller
implementations, is introduced in (3.22). Here, a and b are used to represent
∆αi and ∆βi, and we introduced a predicate vector equal(x,y) that com-
pares vectors x,y and operator lin comb(D,a1,...,an) that presents the
linear combination of n columns of D with weights a1,...,an.
3.3 Framework for Automatic Verification
In this section, we present the developed automatic verification framework
based on the previously described invariants for LTI controllers (see Fig. 5.1).
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To automatically verify C code annotated with ACSL specification [10], we
employ the popular software verification platform Frama-C [22]. We also
exploit WP [9], a plugin of Frama-C that enables deductive verification of C
code with ACSL annotations. Given annotated C code, Frama-C/WP parses
the code and performs the weakest precondition calculations to analyze the
validity of the annotations in the code. For each annotation, Frama-C/WP
generate a set of proof obligations to establish that the C code satisfies the
annotated specification.
Frama-C/WP supports generation of proof obligations in the intermedi-
ate specification language WhyML [1]. The generated proof obligations in
WhyML can be submitted to various theorem provers via the Why3 plat-
form [13], both automatic theorem provers (e.g., Z3 [26]) or interactive theo-
rem provers (e.g., Coq [7]). To automate the verification process, we employ
the automatic theorem prover Z3 to discharge the proof obligations. Z3 is
an SMT solver that checks satisfiability of a given formula modulo a certain
theory, and to check the validity of the proof goal of a proof obligation, we
used Why3 to generate an SMT instance for Z3.
While transforming annotated C code to an SMT instance along the
toolchain in Fig. 5.1, we observed that WP and Why3 tend to generate
the declarations for some extra theories in their outputs; these are not nec-
essary to prove the proof goal, but could adversely affect the performance of
the SMT solving with Z3. In addition, some of the generated declarations
in the intermediate specifications are not directly relevant to the proof goal,
while others are redundant since they have been already incorporated in Z3.
Therefore, to improve the performance at the SMT solving stage, we created
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an automated Python script to intervene in the transformation and remove
unnecessary theory declarations from the intermediate specifications such as
the proof obligations in WhyML and SMT instances.
In the deductive verification of the verif driver function, which as de-
scribed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 by construction invokes the step function a
certain number of times, the function contract (i.e., pre- and post-condition)
of the step function would be required for the deduction rule for the function
calls. However, it is very difficult to specify the function contract of the step
function without knowing its input-output and state invariant (and which
we in the general case do not know). Thus, to avoid writing the step func-
tion specification, we preprocess the code performing the function inlining
for the step function (i.e., inserting the body of the step function wherever
the function is called in the code). Moreover, the step function may contain
loops. Note that it is challenging to automate the deductive verification of C
code with loops when no loop invariants are provided. To avoid synthesizing
the invariants of the loops in the step function, we transform the code by
unrolling the loops in it. This is possible when the loops have some constant
upper bounds. We note that the size of the controller for embedded system is
statically fixed in many cases, and the upper bound of the loops are normally
bounded in terms of the size of the controller.
Finally, Frama-C/WP supports two different models for floating-point
arithmetic operations of C code: float model and real model. In the float
model, when deriving the weakest precondition WP performs floating-point
operations as defined in the IEEE 754 floating-point standard. This re-
sults in generated proof obligations that are too complex to be handled by
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existing automatic theorem provers. On the other hand, the real model
transforms floating-point operations to operations on reals, thus enabling
the SMT solvers that support arithmetic theory of reals to discharge the
generated proof obligations. As previously stated, in this work we employ
the real model, considering the problem of the bounded error specifications as
the first step toward the full treatment of the problem. Addressing floating-
point computations is an avenue for future work.
3.3.1 Evaluation
To evaluate the developed verification framework, we first considered the
controller specification (i.e., model) from (3.4). We first verified that the
step function from Listing 1 satisfies the state and IO invariants for the
Σ(A,B,C,0) model (3.4). In addition, we verified that the controller Σ sat-
isfies the IO only invariants annotated in the verif driver function from
Listing 2. Using the IO invariants that allow for inexact controller imple-
mentations, as specified in the verif driver function from Listing 3, we
verified the correctness of the step function implementing computationally
more efficient controller Σ˜ from (3.7), with transfer function (3.8). Finally,
we exploited both types of assert statements from (3.18) and (3.19) to spec-
ify instantiation based invariants; we verified IO conformance of the example
controller Σ from (3.4) and the inexact controller Σ˜ from (3.7) using the
invariant (3.22).
Furthermore, we verified randomly generated controllers of varying size
and analyzed how different types of the introduced invariants affect scala-
bility of the verification approach. We also illustrated the use of the devel-
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Figure 3.2: Z3 running times for LTI controller verification using five different
types of controller invariants.
oped framework on verification of LTI controllers automatically generated by
Simulink Coder from both discrete-time State-Space and LTI System library
blocks. Note that, although these blocks can be used to specify the same
mathematical model, the structures of the actual code generated from these
blocks are significantly different.
We evaluated verification performance for both ‘exact’ and ‘inexact’ input-
output invariants. We considered five different types of invariants: (a) IO and
state invariants (denoted by SS invariants) introduced in (6.1); (b) IO only
invariants based on the transfer function (denoted by TF), defined in (3.3)
and (3.6), (c) Instantiation-based IO invariants defined in (3.16) and (3.18)
(referred to as IB′3n+1), (d) Instantiation-based IO invariants defined in (3.16)
and (3.19) (referred to as IB′′3n+1), (e) Instantiation based IO invariants for
only 2n + 1 points when the state variable is known, as described in Re-
mark 3.2.1 on (3.18) – referred to as IB′2n+1, (f) Instantiation-based IO in-
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Figure 3.3: Z3 running times for verification of LTI controllers using ‘inexact’
invariants for all five different types of controller invariants. Note that in this
case, verification of TF invariants does not scale well because controllers with
the size greater than two can not be verified.
variants for only 2n + 1 points when the state variable is known and based,
as described in Remark 3.2.1, on (3.19) – referred to as IB′2n+1. Except the
SS invariants, all other types of invariants were evaluated for both exact and
inexact controller implementations.
Fig. 3.2 presents measured Z3 running times for verification of random
controller implementations that exactly implement specified transfer func-
tions. Note that for each considered controller size n, we randomly generated
50 controllers. Fig. 3.2 presents the average running times (along with the
ranges of running times) for different controller size n and different type of
invariants. As expected, the use of SS invariants scales best. However, note
that SS invariants can be used only when we know the implemented state-
space model of the controller. On the other hand, the use of TF invariants
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also scales well when the exact transfer function of the implemented con-
troller is known. Finally, due to the size of the generated proof obligations
for both IB′3n+1 and IB
′′
3n+1 invariants, verification using these invariants
takes the most time.
To evaluate verification performance with inexact controller implemen-
tations, for each of the different controller sizes n we generated 50 random
controller models. Then, for each model we would try to verify an imple-
mentation of a controller similar to the initial controller (i.e., with the same
transfer function), in order to obtain controllers with inexact implementa-
tions. Since we could not know the state invariants for these controllers, we
were not able to test the use of SS invariants. The results of our experi-
ments are presented in Fig. 3.3. Our first observation is that with inexact
implementations, the TF-invariants based verification scales very poorly; we
were not able to verify the TF invariants for controllers with more than two
states. The reason for this is that TF invariants employ both universal and
existential quantifiers, as we have discussed in Section 3.1. On the other
hand, as expected (due to the use of only existential quantifiers) verification
of instantiation-based invariants scales reasonably well (both IB′3n+1 and
IB′′3n+1).
Finally, we analyzed the amount of time used by each tool in the verifica-
tion framework. As shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.1 most of the verification time
is used by Frama-C generating proof obligations in WhyML. Interestingly,
running times for Z3 (shown in Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.3) present less than 5%
of the overall verification times.
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SS TF IB′2n+1 IB
′′
2n+1 IB
′
3n+1 IB
′′
3n+1
Frama-C 76.6% 61.2% 51.8% 54.4% 49.8% 51.7%
Why3 20.5% 37.3% 47.7% 45.1% 49.6% 47.7%
Z3 2.8% 1.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6%
Total time 0.3(s) 0.8(s) 2.1(s) 2.2(s) 4.6(s) 4.8(s)
Table 3.1: Percentage of time used by each tool in the verification framework
for verification of controllers of size n = 10 with inexact implementations.
SS TF IB′2n+1 IB
′′
2n+1 IB
′
3n+1 IB
′′
3n+1
Frama-C 77.6% 66.5% 55.2% 57.9% 56.0% 58.5%
Why3 20.2% 32.9% 44.7% 42.0% 43.7% 41.2%
Z3 2.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.3%
Total time 0.4(s) 6.0(s) 27.4(s) 29.2(s) 56.7(s) 60.1(s)
Table 3.2: Percentage of time used by each tool in the verification framework
for verification of controllers of size n = 18 with exact implementations.
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Chapter 4
Similarity Checking-based
Verification Approach
This chapter presents a similarity checking-based verification method [60].
This approach is based on extracting a model from the controller code and
establishing equivalence between the original and the extracted models. Our
technical approach relies on symbolic execution of the generated code. Sym-
bolic expressions for state and output variables of the control function are
used to reconstruct the model of the controller. The reconstructed model is
then checked for input-output equivalence between the original and recon-
structed model, using the well-known necessary and sufficient condition for
the equivalence of two minimal LTI models. Verification is performed us-
ing real arithmetic. We account for some numerical errors by allowing for a
bounded discrepancy between the models. We compare two approaches for
checking the equivalence; one reduces the equivalence problem to an SMT
problem, while the other uses a convex optimization formulation. We com-
51
pare equivalence checking to an alternative verification approach introduced
in Chapter 3, which converts the original LTI model into input-output based
code annotations for verification at the code level.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 presents model extraction
from code, followed by the equivalence checking in Section 4.2. Section 4.3
evaluates the performance of the approaches.
4.1 Model Extraction from Linear Controller
Implementation
In order to verify a linear controller implementation against its specification,
we first extract an LTI model from the implementation (i.e., step function),
and then compare it to the specification (i.e., the initial model). To obtain
an LTI model from the step function, it is first necessary to identify the
computation of the step function based on the program semantics. By the
computation of a program, we mean how the execution of the program affects
the global state.1 This is also known as the big-step transition relation of a
program, which is the relation between states before and after the execution
of the program. In the next subsection, we explain how to identify the big-
step transition relation of the step function via symbolic execution.
4.1.1 Symbolic Execution of Step Function
According to the symbolic execution semantics [47, 17, 14], we symbolically
execute the step function with symbolic inputs and symbolic controller state.
1Note that we assume that data is exchanged with the step function via global variables.
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When the execution is finished, we examine the effect of the step function
on the global state where output and new controller state are produced as
symbolic formulas.
Model extraction via symbolic execution may not be applicable to any ar-
bitrary program (e.g., non-terminating program, file/network IO program).
However, we argue that it is feasible when focusing on the linear controller
implementations which are self-contained (i.e., no dependencies on external
functions) and have simple control flows (e.g., for the sake of deterministic
real-time behaviors). During symbolic execution, we check if each step of the
execution satisfies certain rules (i.e., restrictions), otherwise it is rejected.
The rules are as follows: first of all, the conditions of conditional branches
should be always evaluated to concrete boolean values. We argue that the
step functions of linear controllers are unlikely necessary to branch over sym-
bolic values such as symbolic inputs or symbolic controller states. Moreover,
in many cases, the upper bound of the loops of step functions are statically
fixed based on the size of the controllers, so the loop condition can be eval-
uated to concrete values as well. This rule results in yielding the finite and
deterministic symbolic execution path of the step function. The second rule
is that it is not allowed to use symbolic arguments when calling the standard
mathematical functions (e.g., sin, cos, log, exp) because the use of such
non-linear functions may result in non-linear input-output relation of the
step function. Moreover, it is also not allowed to call external libraries (e.g.,
file/network IO APIs, functions without definitions provided). This rule re-
stricts the step function to be self-contained and to avoid using non-linear
mathematical functions. Lastly, dereferencing a symbolic memory address
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is not allowed because the non-deterministic behavior of memory access is
undesirable for controller implementations and may result in unintended in-
formation flow.
As the result of the symbolic execution of the step function, the global
variables are updated with symbolic formulas. By collecting the updated
variables and their new values (i.e., symbolic formulas), the big-step transi-
tion relation of the step function can be represented as a system of equations;
each equation is in the following form
v(new) = f(v1, v2, . . . , vt)
where t is the number of variables used in the symbolic formula f , v, vi are
the global variables, v(new) denotes that the variable v is updated with the
symbolic formula on the right-hand side of the equation, the variable without
the superscript “(new)” denotes the initial symbolic value of the variable (i.e.,
from the initial state before symbolic execution of the step function). We call
this equation transition equation.
For example, we consider symbolic execution for the step function in
Listing 5 in Appendix A, obtained from the model (2.5), (2.6); we illustrate
the transition equations of the step function as follows, replacing the original
variable names with new shortened names for presentation purpose only, such
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as x for LTIS DW.Internal DSTATE, u for LTIS U.u, and y for LTIS Y.y:
x[0](new) = ((0.87224 · x[0]) + ((0.822174 · u[0]) + (−0.438008 · u[1])))
x[1](new) = ((0.366377 · x[1]) + ((−0.278536 · u[0]) + (−0.824312 · u[1])))
x[2](new) = ((−0.540795 · x[2]) + ((0.874484 · u[0]) + (0.858857 · u[1])))
x[3](new) = ((−0.332664 · x[3]) + ((−0.117628 · u[0]) + (−0.506362 · u[1])))
x[4](new) = ((−0.204322 · x[4]) + ((−0.955459 · u[0]) + (−0.622498 · u[1])))
y[0](new) = (((((−0.793176 · x[0]) + (0.154365 · x[1])) + (−0.377883 · x[2]))
+(−0.360608 · x[3])) + (−0.142123 · x[4]))
y[1](new) = (((((0.503767 · x[0]) + (−0.573538 ∗ ·x[1])) + (0.170245 · x[2]))
+(−0.583312 · x[3])) + (−0.56603 · x[4])).
(4.1)
4.1.2 Linear Time-Invariant System Model Extraction
To extract an LTI model from the obtained transition equations, we first
determine which variables are used to store the controller state. To do this,
we examine the data flow among the variables which appear in the equations.
Let Vused be the set of used variables which appears on the right-hand side of
the transition equations. Let Vupdated be the set of updated variables which
appears on the left-hand side of the transition equations. As the interface of
the step function, we assume that the sets of input and output variables are
given, which are denoted by Vinput and Voutput, respectively. We define the
set of state variables Vstate as
Vstate = (Vupdated \ Voutput) ∪ (Vused \ Vinput).
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For example, from the transition equations (4.1), x[0], x[1], x[2], x[3] and
x[4] are identified as controller state variables as given the input variables
u[0] and u[1], and the output variables y[0] and y[1].
The next step is to convert the transition equations into a canonical form.
We fully expand the expressions on the right-hand side of the transition equa-
tions using the distributive law. The resulting expressions are represented
in the form of the sum of products without containing any parentheses. We
check if the expressions equations are linear (i.e., each product term should
be the multiplication of a constant and a single variable), and otherwise, it
is rejected. Finally, each transition equation is represented as the following
canonical form
v(new) = c1v1 + c2v2 + · · ·+ ctvt
where t is the number of product terms, v ∈ Vupdated is the updated variable,
vi ∈ Vused are the used variables, and ci ∈ R are the coefficients. When
converting the transition equations into canonical form, we regard floating-
point arithmetic expressions as real arithmetic expressions. The analysis of
the discrepancy between them is left for future work. Instead, in the next
section, the discrepancy issue between two LTI models due to numerical
errors of floating-point arithmetic is addressed as the first step toward the
full treatment of the problem.
Since the transition equations in canonical form are a system of linear
equations, we finally rewrite the transition equations as matrix equations.
In order to do this, we first define the input variable vector u = vec(Vinput),
the output variable vector y = vec(Voutput) and the state variable vector
x = vec(Vstate) where vec(V ) denotes the vectorization of the set V (e.g.,
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vec({v1, v2, v3}) = [v1, v2, v3]T). This allows for rewriting each transition
equation in terms of the state variable vector x and the input variable vector
u as
v(new) = [c1, c2, . . . , cn]x + [d1, d2, . . . , dp]u
where n is the length of the state variable vector, p is the length of the input
variable vector and ci, di ∈ R are constants. Finally, we rewrite the transition
equations as two matrix equations as follows
x(new) = Aˆx + Bˆu
y(new) = Cˆx + Dˆu
where Aˆ ∈ Rn×n, Bˆ ∈ Rn×p, Cˆ ∈ Rm×n, Dˆ ∈ Rm×p, and for any vector
v = [v1, . . . vt]
T, we define v(new) = [v
(new)
1 , . . . , v
(new)
t ]
T.
For example, consider the transition equation about y[0](new) in (4.1),
which is represented in canonical form, and then rewritten as a vector equa-
tion (i.e., equation in terms of the state and the input variable vectors) as
follows
y[0](new) = (((((−0.793176 · x[0]) + (0.154365 · x[1])) + (−0.377883 · x[2]))
+(−0.360608 · x[3])) + (−0.142123 · x[4]))
= −0.793176 · x[0] + 0.154365 · x[1] +−0.377883 · x[2]
+− 0.360608 · x[3] +−0.142123 · x[4]
= [−0.793176, 0.154365,−0.377883,−0.360608,−0.142123] · x + [0, 0] · u
where x = [x[0], x[1], x[2], x[3], x[4]]T, and u = [u[0], u[1]]T. Converting each
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transition equation (4.1) into the corresponding vector equation, we finally
reconstruct the LTI model (i.e., same as (2.5) (2.6)) from the step function
of Listing 5 in Appendix A.
Remark. In general, the size of the extracted model Σˆ may not be equal to the
size of the initial controller model Σ from (6.1) (i.e., n). As we assume that
Σ is minimal, if the obtained model has the size less than n it would clearly
have to violate input-output (IO) requirements of the controller. However,
if the size of Σˆ is larger than n, we consider a controllable and observable
subsystem computed via Kalman decomposition [64] from the extracted model,
as the Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ) model extracted from the code. Note that Σˆ is minimal
in this case, and thus its size has to be equal to n to provide IO conformance
with the initial model.
4.2 Input-Output Equivalence Checking be-
tween Linear Controller Models
In order to verify a linear controller implementation against an LTI specifica-
tion, in the previous section we described how to extract an LTI model from
the implementation. This section introduces a method to check input-output
(IO) equivalence between two linear controller models: (1) the original LTI
specification and (2) the LTI model extracted from the implementation.
To check the IO equivalence between two LTI models, we exploit the fact
that two minimal LTI models with the same size are IO equivalent if and
only if they are similar to each other. Two LTI models Σ(A,B,C,D) and
Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ) are said to be similar if there exists a non-singular matrix T
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such that
Aˆ = TAT−1, Bˆ = TB, Cˆ = CT−1, and Dˆ = D (4.2)
where T is referred to as the similarity transformation matrix [64]. Thus,
given two minimal LTI models, the problem of equivalence checking between
the models is reduced to the problem of finding a similarity transformation
matrix for the models. The rest of this section explains how to formulate
this problem as a satisfiability problem and a convex optimization problem.
4.2.1 Satisfiability Problem Formulation
We start by describing an approach to formulate the problem of finding sim-
ilarity transformation matrices as the satisfiability problem instance when
two LTI models Σ(A,B,C,D) and Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ) are given. Since exist-
ing SMT solvers hardly support matrices and linear algebra operations, we
encode the similarity transformation matrix T as a set of scalar variables
{Ti,j | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n} where Ti,j is the variable to represent the element in
the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix T. The following constraints
rephrase the equations of (4.2) in an element-wise manner
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Aˆi,kTk,j =
∑
1≤k≤n
Ti,kAk,j
)
∧
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
(
Bˆi,j =
∑
1≤k≤n
Ti,kBk,j
)
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Cˆi,kTk,j = Ci,j
)
∧
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
Dˆi,j = Di,j
(4.3)
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It is important to highlight that although a similarity transform always
results in an IO equivalent new controller, due to finite-precision computation
of the code generator performing controller optimization, it is expected that
the produced controller will slightly differ from a controller that is similar
to the initial controller. Consequently, there is a need to extend our input-
output invariants for the case with imprecise specification of the similarity
transform. To achieve this, given error bound , the following constraints
extends (4.3) to tolerate errors up to error bound 
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
− ≤
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Aˆi,kTk,j
)
−
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Ti,kAk,j
)
≤ 
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
− ≤ Bˆi,j −
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Ti,kBk,j
)
≤ 
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
− ≤
( ∑
1≤k≤n
Cˆi,kTk,j
)
− Ci,j ≤ 
∧
1≤i≤n
∧
1≤j≤n
− ≤ Dˆi,j −Di,j ≤ 
(4.4)
For example, suppose that the original LTI model Σ(A,B,C,D) from
(2.3)(2.4), the reconstructed model from the implementation Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ)
from (2.5)(2.6) and the error bound  = 10−6 are given. Having the problem
instance formulated as (4.4), the similarity transformation matrix T for those
models can be found using an SMT solver which supports the quantifier-free
linear real arithmetic, QF LRA for short. Due to the lack of space, only the
first row of T is shown here
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T1,1 = −445681907965836469807842159338
818667375305282643804030465563
(≈ −0.544399156750667)
T1,2 = −135442022883031921128620509482
818667375305282643804030465563
(≈ −0.165442059801384)
T1,3 =
198172776374831449251211655628
818667375305282643804030465563
(≈ 0.242067461044165)
T1,4 = −351256050550998919211978953100
818667375305282643804030465563
(≈ −0.429058064513855)
T1,5 = −476345345040634696989970420590
818667375305282643804030465563
(≈ −0.581854284748456)
Since, for the theory of real numbers, SMT solvers use the arbitrary-
precision arithmetic when calculating answers, each element of T is given
as a fractional number of numerous digits. For instance, although it is not
displayed here, T5,4 in this example is a fraction whose numerator and de-
nominator are numbers with more than one hundred digits. Thus, due to the
infinite precision arithmetic used by SMT solvers, the scalability of the SMT
formulation-based approach is questionable. This illustrates the need for a
more efficient approach for similarity checking, and in the next subsection we
will present a convex optimization-based approach as an alternative method.
4.2.2 Convex Optimization Problem Formulation
The idea behind a convex optimization based approach is to use convex opti-
mization to minimize the difference between the initial model and the model
obtained via a similarity transformation from the model extracted from the
code. Specifically, we formulate the equivalence checking for imprecise spec-
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ifications as a convex optimization problem defined as
variables e ∈ R,T ∈ Rn×n
minimize e
subject to  ≤ e,∥∥∥AˆT−TA∥∥∥
∞
≤ e,
∥∥∥Bˆ−TB∥∥∥
∞
≤ e,∥∥∥CˆT−C∥∥∥
∞
≤ e,
∥∥∥Dˆ−D∥∥∥
∞
≤ e
(4.5)
For example, given two LTI models Σ(A,B,C,D) from (2.3)(2.4) and
Σˆ(Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ) from (2.5)(2.6) and the error bound  = 10−6, by (5.16), the
similarity transformation matrix T can be found using the convex optimiza-
tion solver CVX as follows
T =

−0.5443990427 −0.1654425774 0.2420672805 −0.4290576934 −0.5818538874
−0.4440654044 −0.7588435418 0.1765807738 0.2799578419 0.5647456751
−0.588433439 −0.2004321431 0.6773771193 0.4815317446 0.1449186163
0.9314576739 −0.0459172638 0.6095691172 0.3808322795 0.8653864392
−0.2372386619 0.5190687755 0.8165534522 −0.1493619803 0.1461696487

In addition, the original similarity transformation matrix Tori used in the
actual transformation from Σ to Σˆ is
Tori =

−0.5443991568 −0.1654420598 0.242067461 −0.4290580645 −0.5818542847
−0.4440652236 −0.7588431653 0.1765807449 0.279957637 0.564745456
−0.5884339121 −0.2004321022 0.677376781 0.4815316264 0.144918173
0.9314574825 −0.0459170889 0.6095698017 0.3808324602 0.8653867983
−0.2372380836 0.5190691678 0.816552622 −0.1493625727 0.1461689364

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Figure 4.1: The verification toolchain for the similarity checking-based ap-
proach.
resulting in the difference between two matrices equal to
|T−Tori| =

0.000000114 0.0000005176 0.0000001806 0.0000003711 0.0000003973
0.0000001809 0.0000003766 0.000000029 0.0000002049 0.0000002191
0.0000004731 0.0000000408 0.0000003384 0.0000001182 0.0000004433
0.0000001914 0.0000001749 0.0000006844 0.0000001807 0.0000003591
0.0000005783 0.0000003923 0.0000008302 0.0000005924 0.0000007123

.
4.3 Evaluation
To evaluate our verification approach described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2,
we compared it to our earlier work based on invariant checking in Chapter 3.
4.3.1 Verification Toolchain
We implemented an automatic verification framework (presented in Fig. 5.1)
based on the proposed approach described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2.
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We refer to this approach as similarity checking (SC)-based approach. Given
a step function (i.e., C code), we employ the off-the-shelf symbolic execution
tool PathCrawler [83] to symbolically execute the step function and generate
a set of transition equations. The model extractor which implements the
method in Section 4.1.2 extracts an LTI model from the transition equa-
tions. Finally, the equivalence checker based on the method in Section 4.2
decides the similarity between the extracted LTI model and the given specifi-
cation (i.e., LTI model), and produces the verification result. The equivalence
checker uses either the SMT solver CVC4 [8]2 or the convex optimization
solver CVX [40] depending on the formulation employed, which is described
in Section 4.2.
For the invariant checking (IC)-based approach described in Chapter 3,
we use the toolchain Frama-C/Why3/Z3 to verify C code with annotated
controller invariants, as described in Chapter 3. The step function is anno-
tated with the invariants as described in Chapter 3. Given annotated C code,
Frama-C/Why3 [22, 13] generates proof obligations as SMT instances. The
SMT solver Z3 [26]3 solves the proof obligations and produces the verification
result (see Chapter 3 for more details).
4.3.2 Scalability Evaluation
To evaluate the SC-based approach compared to the IC-based approach, we
randomly generate stable linear controller specifications (i.e., the elements
2CVC4 was chosen among other SMT solvers because it showed the best performance
for our QF LRA SMT instances.
3Z3 was chosen among other SMT solvers because it showed the best performance for
the generated proof obligations in our experiment.
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of Σ(A,B,C,D)). Since we observed that the controller dimension n dom-
inates the performance (i.e., running time) of both approaches, we vary n
from 2 to 14, and generate three controller specifications for each n. For each
controller specification, we employ the code generator Embedded Coder to
generate the step function in C. Since we use the LTI system block of Simulink
for code generation, the structure of generated C code is not straightforward,
having multiple loops and pointer arithmetic operations as illustrated in the
step function [59]. This negatively affects the performance of the IC-based
approach for reasons to be described later in this subsection. For a compara-
tive evaluation, we use both SC-based and IC-based approaches to verify the
generated step function C code against its specification. For each generated
controller, we checked that IC-based and SC-based approaches give the same
verification result, as long as both complete normally.
To thoroughly compare both approaches, we measure the running time of
the front-end and the back-end of each approach separately. By the front-end,
we refer to the process from parsing C code to generating proof obligations
to be input for constraint solvers. The front-end of the SC-based approach
includes the symbolic execution by PathCrawler and the model extraction,
while the front-end of the IC-based approach is processing annotated code
and generating proof obligations by Frama-C/Why3. On the other hand,
by the back-end, we refer to the process of constraint solving. While the
back-end of the SC-based approach is the IO equivalence checking based
on either SMT solving using CVC4 or convex optimization solving using
CVX, the back-end of the IC-based approach is proving the generated proof
obligations using Z3.
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Figure 4.2: The average running time of the front-ends of both SC-based and
IC-based approaches (with the log-scaled y-axis)
We first evaluate the frond-end of both approaches (i.e., the whole verifi-
cation process until constraint solving). Fig. 4.2 shows that the average run-
ning time of the front-ends of both approaches, where missing bars indicate no
data due to the lack of scalability of the utilized verification approach (e.g.,
the tool’s abnormal termination or no termination for a prolonged time).
Here, IB ′2n+1, IB
′′
3n+1, IB
′′
3n+1 and IB
′
2n+1 denote the variations of annotating
methods as described in Chapter 3. We observe that the running time of
the IC-based approaches exponentially increase as the controller dimension
n increases, while the SC-based approach remains scalable. The main reason
for this is that the IC-based approach requires the preprocessing of code (as
described in Chapter 3), which is unrolling the execution of the step function
multiple times (e.g., 2n + 1 or 3n + 1 times) as well as unrolling each loop
in the step function (n+ 1) times. Therefore, in contrast with the SC-based
approach, the IC-based approach needs to handle the significantly increased
lines of code due to unrolling, so it does not scale up.
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Figure 4.3: The average running time of the back-ends of both SC-based and
IC-based approaches (with the log-scaled y-axis)
Next, we evaluate the back-end of both approaches (i.e., constraint solv-
ing). Fig. 4.3 shows the average running time of the back-ends of both
approaches, where missing bars result from the lack of scalability of either
the constraint solver used at this stage or the front-end tools. “SC-based
(CVC4)” denotes the SMT-based formulation while “SC-based (CVX)” de-
notes the convex optimization-based formulation. Recall that the SC-based
approach using CVC4 and the IC-based approaches employ the SMT solvers
for constraint solving, which uses the arbitrary-precision arithmetic. We
observe that the running time of the back-ends of those approaches expo-
nentially increase as the controller dimension n increases because of the cost
of the bignum arithmetic, while the SC-based approach using CVX remains
scalable.
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Chapter 5
Verification of Finite-Precision
Controller Software
This chapter describes an extended method [61] that builds on the similar-
ity checking-based method in Chapter 4 in order to verify finite-precision
controller software considering the effect of floating-point arithmetic. In
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, we explored several approaches to the verification
of implementations of linear time invariant (LTI) controllers. In LTI con-
trollers, the relationships between the values of inputs and state variables,
and between state variables and outputs, are captured as linear functions,
and coefficients of these functions are constant (i.e., time-invariant). The
main limitation in all of these approaches is the assumption that the cal-
culations are performed using real numbers. Of course, real numbers are
a mathematical abstraction. In practice, software performs calculations us-
ing a limited-precision representation of numbers, such as the floating-point
representation. The use of floating-point numbers introduces errors into the
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computation, which have to be accounted for in the verification process.
In this chapter, we build on the work of Chapter 4, which follows an
equivalence checking approach. We apply symbolic execution to the gen-
erated code, which calculates symbolic expressions for the values of state
and output variables in the code at the completion of the invocation of the
controller. We use these symbolic values to reconstruct a mathematical rep-
resentation of the control function. We introduce error terms into this rep-
resentation that characterize the effects of numerical errors. The verification
step then tries to establish the approximate equivalence between the speci-
fication of the control function and the reconstructed representation. In the
last chapter (Chapter 4), we considered two promising alternatives for as-
sessing the equivalence: one based on SMT solving and the other one based
on convex optimization. Somewhat surprisingly, when the error terms that
account for floating-point calculations are added, the SMT-solving approach
becomes impractical, while the optimization-based approach suffers minimal
degradation in performance.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 describes how to extract
a model from the controller code. Section 5.2 presents the approximate
equivalence checking. Section 5.3 evaluates the scalability of our approach.
5.1 Extracting Model from Floating-Point Con-
troller Implementation
Our approach to the verification of a controller implementation against its
mathematical model takes two steps: we first extract a model from the finite
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precision implementation (i.e., step function using floating-point arithmetic),
and then compare it with the original model. This approach is an extension
of the method in Chapter 4 to consider the quantization error in the finite-
precision implementation. To obtain a model from the step function, we
employ the symbolic execution technique [17, 47], which allows us to identify
the computation of the step function (i.e., the big-step transition relation
on global states between before and after the execution of the step func-
tion). From the transition relation, we extract a mathematical model for
the controller implementation. Since the implementation has floating-point
quantization (i.e., roundoff) errors, the representation of the extracted model
includes roundoff error terms, thus being different from the representation of
the initial LTI model (6.1). We will describe the representation of extracted
models in the next subsection.
5.1.1 Quantized Controller Model
A finite precision computation (e.g., floating-point arithmetic) involves round-
ing errors, which makes the computation result slightly deviated from the
exact value that might be computed with the infinite precision computation.
The floating-point rounding error can be modeled with the notions of both
absolute error and relative error. The absolute error is defined as the differ-
ence between an exact number and its rounded number. The relative error
defines such difference relative to the exact number. To model quantized
controller implementations, we extend the representation of LTI model (6.1)
with the new terms of absolute errors and relative errors, and obtain the
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following representation of quantized controller model:
zˆk+1 = (Aˆ + EA)zˆk + (Bˆ + EB)uk + ez
yk = (Cˆ + EC)zˆk + (Dˆ + ED)uk + ey.
(5.1)
where Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ and Dˆ are controller parameters. EA, EB, EC and ED are
the relative errors regarding the state and input variables which are bounded
by the relative error bound brel such that ‖EA‖ , ‖EB‖ , ‖EC‖ , ‖ED‖ ≤ brel
where ‖·‖ is the L∞ norm operator. In addition, ez and ey are the abso-
lute errors which are bounded by the absolute error bound babs such that
‖ex‖ , ‖ey‖ ≤ babs. In the rest of this section, we explain how to extract
a quantized controller model (Aˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ, Dˆ, brel, babs) from the floating-point
controller implementation via symbolic execution and floating-point error
analysis techniques.
5.1.2 Symbolic Execution of Floating-Point Controller
Implementation
In our approach, the symbolic execution technique [17, 47] is employed to
analyze the step function C code. We symbolically execute the step function
with symbolic values such as symbolic inputs and symbolic controller states,
and examine the change of the program’s global state where the output and
new controller state are updated with symbolic expressions in terms of the
symbolic values. The goal of the symbolic execution in our approach is to find
symbolic formulas that concisely represent the computation of the step func-
tion C code that originally has loops and pointer arithmetic operations. The
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idea behind this symbolic execution process is that the linear controller im-
plementations that we consider in this work have simple control flows for the
sake of deterministic real-time behaviors (e.g., fixed upper bound of loops),
thus being amenable to our symbolic execution process. Consequently, the
symbolic execution of linear controller implementations yield finite and de-
terministic symbolic execution paths (as described in Chapter 4).
However, unlike the approach in Chapter 4, this work herein newly con-
siders the effect of floating-point rounding errors in the step function. Thus it
is necessary to pay special attention (e.g., normalization [14]) to the floating-
point computation in symbolic execution. When symbolic expressions are
constructed with floating-point operators in the course of symbolic execu-
tion, the evaluation order of floating-point operations should be preserved
according to the floating-point program semantics, because floating-point
arithmetic does not hold basic algebraic properties such as associativity and
distributivity in general.
Once the symbolic execution is completed, symbolic formulas are pro-
duced. The symbolic formulas represent the computation of the step function
in a concise way (i.e., in the arithmetic expression form without loops, func-
tion calls and side effects). The produced symbolic formula has the following
form, which we call transition equation:
v(new) = f(v1, v2, . . . , vt) (5.2)
where v(new) is a global variable which is updated with the symbolic expres-
sion, vi are the initial symbolic values of the corresponding variables before
the symbolic execution of the step function. f(v1, v2, . . . , vt) is the symbolic
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expression that consists of floating-point operations where t is the number
of variables used in f . This expression should preserve the correct order of
evaluation according to the floating-point semantics of the step function C
code.
For example, consider the step function in [59] , which is generated by
Embedded Coder (the code generator of MATLAB/Simulink) for the LTI
controller models (2.5)(2.6). We illustrate one of the transition equations
obtained from the symbolic execution of the step function as follows:
y[1](new) = (((((0.503767⊗ x[0])⊕ (−0.573538⊗ x[1]))⊕ (0.170245⊗ x[2]))
⊕(−0.583312⊗ x[3]))⊕ (−0.56603⊗ x[4])).
(5.3)
where x is the shortened name for LTIS DW.Internal DSTATE, and y is the
shortened name for LTIS Y.y for presentation purposes only, and ⊕, 	 and
⊗ are floating-point operators corresponding to +, − and × respectively. In
the next subsection, we explain how to extract the quantized model (5.11)
from the symbolic expressions.
5.1.3 Quantization Error Analysis and Model Extrac-
tion
This subsection explains how to extract the quantized controller model (5.11)
from a set of symbolic expressions (5.2) obtained from the step function.
The symbolic expression consists of floating-point operations of symbolic
values and numeric constants. We first describe how to analyze the floating-
point quantization (i.e., roundoff) error in the symbolic expression evaluation.
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Since we only consider linear controller implementations rejecting nonlinear
cases in the symbolic execution phase, the symbolic expression f obtained
from the step function has the the following syntax, thus guaranteeing the
linearity:
f := v | f ⊕ f | f 	 f | f ~ fc | fc ~ f
fc := c | fc ~ fc
where v is a variable (i.e., the initial symbolic value of the variable), c is
a constant, and ~ ∈ {⊕,	,⊗}. fc is a sub-expression which contains no
variable, thus being evaluated to a constant, while f contains at least one
variable. The multiplication operation ⊗ appears only when at least one
operand is a constant-expression fc, thus preventing the expression from
being nonlinear (i.e., the product of two symbolic values).
In order to simplify a certain program analysis problem, a common as-
sumption is often made in the literature [35, 60] that the floating-point oper-
ations (e.g., ⊕, 	 and ⊗) behave the same way as the real operations (e.g., +,
− and ×) with no rounding. Under this assumption, the equation (5.2) can
be represented in the following canonical form presented earlier in Chapter 4:
v(new) =
t∑
i=1
civi (5.4)
where t is the number of product terms, v,vi are variables, and ci is the
coefficient. In reality, however, floating-point numbers have limited precision,
and the floating-point operations involve rounding errors. In this work, we
consider the effect of such floating-point rounding errors in the verification.
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The IEEE 754 standard [2] views a finite precision floating-point opera-
tion as the corresponding real operation followed by a rounding operation:
x1 ~ x2 = rnd(x1 ∗ x2) (5.5)
where ~ ∈ {⊕,	,⊗} and ∗ is the corresponding real arithmetic operation
to ~. A rounding operator rnd is a function that takes a real number as
input and returns as output a floating-point number that is closest to the
input real number, thus causes a quantization error (i.e., rounding error) in
the floating-point operation. There are multiple common rounding operators
(e.g. round to the nearest, ties to even) defined in the IEEE 754 standard [2].
A rounding operator can be modeled as follows [38]:
rnd(x) = x(1 + e) + d (5.6)
for some e and d where e is a relative error, d is an absolute error, and
|e| ≤  and |d| ≤ δ.  and δ can be determined according to the rounding
mode and the precision (i.e., the number of bits) of the system. For example,
 = 2−53 and δ = 2−1075 for the double precision (i.e., 64 bits) rounding to
the nearest [68]. Combining the two equations (5.5) and (5.6), we have the
following model for the floating-point operations:
x1 ~ x2 = (x1 ∗ x2)(1 + e) + d (5.7)
After rewriting the symbolic expression of the transition equation (5.2) ap-
plying the equation (5.7), suppose that we have the following equation form:
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v(new) =
∑
civi + errrel + errabs (5.8)
where
∑
civi is the exact expression as (5.4), and errabs is the absolute error
term bounded by babs such that |errabs| ≤ babs. errrel is the relative error
term which is related to the variables {vi} (i.e., symbolic values). We rewrite
errrel as
∑
errivi where erri is the relative error term specific to the variable
vi, and bi is the upper bound for erri such that |erri| ≤ bi. We relax the
equation by over-approximating each erri as follows:
v(new) =
∑
civi +
∑
errivi + errabs
=
∑
civi + err
∑
vi + errabs (5.9)
where err is bounded by brel such that |err| ≤ brel where brel is defined as
brel = max{bi}.
We now rearrange and group the product terms by variable names such
as the state variables and the input variables. We assume that the names of
input and output variables are given as the interface of the step function. The
state variables can be identified as the variables appearing in the transition
equations which are not input variables nor output variables. In addition to
the rearrangement, by transforming the sum of products into a form of scalar
product of vectors, we have:
v(new) =[c1, c2, ..., cn]x + [err, err, ..., err]x (5.10)
+ [c′1, c
′
2, ..., c
′
p]u + [err, err, ..., err]u + errabs
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where x is the vector of state variables, and u is the vector of input variables.
Finally, we rewrite the transition equations as two matrix equations as
follows:
x(new) = (Aˆ + EA)x + (Bˆ + EB)u + ex
y(new) = (Cˆ + EC)x + (Dˆ + ED)u + ey.
(5.11)
where Aˆ ∈ Rn×n, Bˆ ∈ Rn×p, Cˆ ∈ Rm×n and Dˆ ∈ Rm×p. The matrices for the
relative errors are bounded by b∗rel such that ‖EA‖ , ‖EB‖ , ‖EC‖ , ‖ED‖ ≤
b∗rel. The absolute error vectors ex and ey are bounded by b
∗
abs such that
‖ex‖ , ‖ey‖ ≤ b∗abs. Note that b∗rel and b∗abs can be easily determined using brel
and babs obtained from the floating-point error analysis for each transition
equation.
For example, consider the transition equation (5.3), from which via the
floating-point error analysis, we have:
y[1](new) = (((((0.503767⊗ x[0])⊕ (−0.573538⊗ x[1]))⊕ (0.170245⊗ x[2]))
⊕(−0.583312⊗ x[3]))⊕ (−0.56603⊗ x[4]))
= 0.503767 · x[0] +−0.573538 · x[1] + 0.170245 · x[2]
+− 0.583312 · x[3] +−0.56603 · x[4] + errrel + errabs
= 0.503767 · x[0] +−0.573538 · x[1] + 0.170245 · x[2]
+− 0.583312 · x[3] +−0.56603 · x[4]
+err(x[0] + x[1] + x[2] + x[3] + x[4]) + errabs
(5.12)
where |err| ≤ 988331
250000
 ÷ (1 − 4) = brel, and |errabs| ≤ 4 · (1 + )4 · δ = babs.
For the double precision (i.e., 64 bits) rounding to nearest (i.e.,  = 2−53 and
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δ = 2−1075), brel ≈ 4.389071× 10−16 and babs ≈ 1.235164× 10−323.
5.2 Approximate Input-Output Equivalence
Checking
In order to verify a finite precision implementation of the linear controller,
the previous section described how to extract the quantized controller model
from the implementation. In this section, we introduce how to compare the
extracted model (5.11) and the initial model (6.1) with a notion of approxi-
mate input-output (IO) equivalence.
5.2.1 Approximate Input-Output Equivalence
This subsection defines an approximate IO equivalence relation, inspired by
the similarity transformation of LTI systems [64]. In order for two LTI sys-
tems to be IO equivalent to each other, there must exist an invertible linear
mapping T from one system’s state z to another system’s state zˆ such that
z = Tzˆ and zˆ = T−1z. The matrix T is referred to as the similarity trans-
formation matrix [64]. Assuming that a proper T is given, we substitute zk
by Tzˆ in the initial LTI model (6.1), thus having:
Tzˆk+1 = ATzˆk + Buk, yk = CTzˆk + Duk.
or
zˆk+1 = (T
−1AT)zˆk + (T
−1B)uk, yk = (CT)zˆk + Duk. (5.13)
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By the similarity transformation, two LTI systems (6.1) and (5.13) are simi-
lar, meaning that they are IO equivalent. We now compare the transformed
initial LTI model (5.13) and the quantized controller model (5.11) that is
extracted from the step function. Equating the corresponding coefficient
matrices of the two models (5.13) and (5.11), we have:
T−1AT = Aˆ + EA, T−1B = Bˆ + EB, CT = Cˆ + EC, D = Dˆ + ED
or
AT = TAˆ + TEA, B = TBˆ + TEB, CT = Cˆ + EC, D = Dˆ + ED
(5.14)
However, the equality of the exact equivalence condition (5.14) will never
hold because of the floating-point error terms (e.g., EA) and the numerical
errors in the implementation’s controller parameters (e.g., Aˆ) due to the
optimization of the code generator. To overcome this problem, we define and
use an approximate equivalence relation ≈ρ on matrices such that M ≈ρ Mˆ
if and only if
∥∥∥M− Mˆ∥∥∥ ≤ ρ where ρ is a given precision (i.e., threshold for
approximate equivalence). Note that the approximate equivalence relation
≈ρ is not transitive, thus not an equivalence relation unless ρ = 0. With ≈ρ
for a precision ρ, the equations (5.14) are relaxed as follows:
AT ≈ρ TAˆ + TEA, B ≈ρ TBˆ + TEB, CT ≈ρ Cˆ + EC, D ≈ρ Dˆ + ED
(5.15)
Finally, we say that the initial LTI model (6.1) and the quantized model (5.11)
extracted from the implementation are approximately IO equivalent with pre-
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cision ρ if there exists a similarity transformation matrix T which satisfies
(5.15), and the absolute errors of the floating-point computations are neg-
ligible (i.e., ez ≈ρ 0 and ey ≈ρ 0). Note that the problem of checking the
approximate IO equivalence is the problem of finding a proper similarity
transformation matrix. In the rest of this section, we explain how to find the
similarity transformation matrix using a satisfiability problem formulation
and a convex optimization problem formulation.
5.2.2 Satisfiability Problem Formulation
This section discusses the satisfiability problem formulation for the approxi-
mate IO equivalence checking. To find the similarity transformation matrix
using existing SMT solvers, the problem can be formulated roughly as fol-
lows:
∃T : ∀EA,EB,EC,ED : ‖EA‖ , ‖EB‖ , ‖EC‖ , ‖ED‖ ≤ brel =⇒ (5.15) holds
In this formulation, the variable T and the relative error variables (e.g., EA)
are quantified alternately, thus requiring exists/forall (EF) problem solving.
Moreover, the formula involves the non-linear real arithmetic (NRA) due to
the terms TEA and TEB in (5.15). For these reasons, the scalability of
this SMT formulation-based approach is questionable because the current
SMT solvers rarely supports EF-NRA problem solving with scalability. In
the next subsection, we describe a more efficient approach based on convex
optimization as an alternative method.
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5.2.3 Convex Optimization Formulation
This subsection describes the convex optimization-based approach to the ap-
proximate IO equivalence checking. Since the relative error variables EA
make the condition (5.15) inappropriate to be formulated as a convex opti-
mization problem, our approach is to derive a sufficient condition for (5.15).
By over-approximating the error terms and removing the error variables, we
derive such a sufficient condition for (5.15) which is formulated as a convex
optimization problem as follows:
variables e ∈ R,T ∈ Rn×n
minimize e
subject to
∥∥∥AˆT−TA∥∥∥
∞
+ n2 ‖T‖∞ brel ≤ e∥∥∥Bˆ−TB∥∥∥
∞
+ n2 ‖T‖∞ brel ≤ e∥∥∥CˆT−C∥∥∥
∞
+ n · brel ≤ e,
∥∥∥Dˆ−D∥∥∥
∞
+ n · brel ≤ e
(5.16)
The idea behind this formulation is to use convex optimization to find the
minimum precision e and then check whether e ≤ ρ where ρ is the given
precision.
Remark. Our verification method is sound (i.e., no false positive) but not
complete. Due to the relaxations both in the floating-point error approxima-
tion and the approximate IO equivalence checking, there might be a case with
a model and a correct implementation where our method remains indecisive
in the equivalence decision. This can be potentially improved by tightening the
relaxations in future work. In addition, a larger ρ can make the approximate
equivalence decision positive, which is not with a smaller ρ. The IO equiv-
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Figure 5.1: The verification toolchain
alence with a large ρ may not guarantee the controller’s well-behavedness.
Relating the approximate equivalence precision ρ and the performance of the
controller (e.g., robustness) is an avenue of future work.
5.3 Evaluation
This section presents our toolchain for the verification of finite precision
controller implementations, and evaluates its scalability. We also evaluate
computational overhead (i.e., running time) over our own earlier work in
Chapter 4 which assumes that the computations of controller implementa-
tions have no rounding errors.
5.3.1 Toolchain
This subsection presents the verification toolchain (shown in Fig. 5.1) that we
implemented based on our method described in this chapter. The toolchain is
an extension of the tool presented in Chapter 4 to consider the floating-point
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error of step function in verification. The toolchain takes as input a step
function C code and an LTI model specification. We use the off-the-shelf
symbolic execution tool PathCrawler [83] to symbolically execute the step
function and produce the transition equations for the step function. From
the transition equations, the model extractor based on Section 5.1.3 extracts
the quantized controller model using the floating-point error analysis tool
PolyFP [3]. Finally, the extracted quantized model is compared with the
given specification (i.e., LTI model) based on the approximate IO relation
defined in Section 5.2. The approximate IO equivalence checker uses the
convex optimization solver CVX [40] to solve the formulas in Section 5.2.3.
5.3.2 Scalability Analysis
This subsection evaluates the scalability of our approach/toolchain presented
in this chapter. To evaluate, we use the Matlab function drss to randomly
generate discrete stable linear controller specifications (i.e., the elements of
Σ(A,B,C,D)) varying the controller dimension n from 2 to 14. To ob-
tain an IO equivalent implementation, we perform an arbitrary similarity
transformation on Σ, and yield the transformed model Σˆ. We use an LTI
system block of Simulink to allow the Embedded Coder (i.e., code generator
of Matlab/Simulink) to generate a floating-point implementation (i.e., step
function in C) for Σˆ. Note that the generated step function has multiple
loops and pointer arithmetic operations as illustrated in the step function
in [59]. We employ our toolchain to verify that the generated step function
correctly implements the original controller model. We pick the precision ρ
to be 10−6 to tolerate both numerical errors in the similarity transformation
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The running time of our approach
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Figure 5.2: The running time of both the front-end and the back-end of our
approach
and the floating-point controller implementation.
We now evaluate the scalability of our approach running our toolchain
with the random controller specifications and their implementations gener-
ated. We measure the running time of the front-end and the back-end of
our approach separately. The front-end refers to the process of symbolic ex-
ecution of the step function (using PathCrawler) and model extraction using
the floating-point analysis (using PolyFP). The back-end refers to the ap-
proximate IO equivalence checking using convex optimization problem solv-
ing (using CVX). The scalability analysis result is shown in Fig. 5.2, which
demonstrates that our approach is scalable for the realistic size of controller
dimension.
We now evaluate the overhead of our approach compared to the previous
work described in Chapter 4 where the verification problem is simpler than
our verification problem herein because the previous work in Chapter 4 as-
sumes that the computation of step function C code is exact without having
any roundoff error. Our approach herein provides a higher assurance for the
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The overhead in our approach
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Figure 5.3: The overhead in both the front-end and the back-end of our
approach
finite precision controller implementations considering the rounding errors in
computation. Fig. 5.3 shows the computational overhead (i.e., the increase
of running time) in our approach as a result of considering the floating-point
roundoff error in controller implementation verification. We observe that
the overhead of the floating-point error analysis in the front-end is marginal.
The running time of the back-end increases because the convex optimization
problem formulation for approximate IO equivalence requires more compu-
tations to solve. Finally, the total running time only increases marginally
from 0.4% to 7.5% over the previous work in Chapter 4 at a cost of providing
higher assurance for the correctness of the finite precision computations of
controller implementations.
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Chapter 6
Linear Controller Verifier
This chapter describes LCV (Linear Controller Verifier), the prototype tool
that implements our verification approaches in this dissertation. This chap-
ter also evaluates the tool LCV through the case study and the scalability
analysis.
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(Controller Model)
C Code (Controller 
Implementation)
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LTI Representation 
for Model
LTI Representation 
for Implementation
Verification Result 
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Input-Output 
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Figure 6.1: The verification flow of LCV.
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6.1 Verification Flow of Linear Controller Ver-
ifier
This section describes the verification flow (shown in Fig. 6.1) and the im-
plementation details of LCV. LCV takes as input a Simulink block diagram
(i.e., controller model) and a C code (i.e., controller implementation). LCV
assumes that the name of the step function (i.e., controller’s entry function)
is also given, and the step function interfaces through given global variables.
In other words, the input(output) variables are declared in the global scope,
and are written(read) before(after) the execution of the step function.1
LCV can handle any C program that has a deterministic and finite exe-
cution path for a symbolic input, which is often found to be true for many
embedded linear controllers. Moreover, we observe that a Simulink block
diagram of a LTI controller can be converted into a state-space represen-
tation form, thus being amenable to our verification methods. Thus, LCV
can handle any Simulink block diagram which results in an LTI system (i.e.,
satisfying the superposition property). The block diagram may include basic
blocks (e.g., constant block, gain block, sum block), subsystem blocks (i.e.,
hierarchy) and series/parallel/feedback connections of those blocks. Extend-
ing LCV to verify a broader class of controllers is an avenue for future work.
As the first step of the verification, the Simulink block diagram is con-
verted into a state space representation of an LTI system, which is defined
1This convention is used by Embedded Coder, a code generation toolbox for Mat-
lab/Simulink
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Figure 6.2: The simulink block diagram for checking the additivity of the
controller
as follows:
zk+1 = Azk +Buk
yk = Czk +Duk.
(6.1)
where uk, yk and zk are the input vector, the output vector and the state
vector at time k respectively. The matrices A, B, C and D are controller
parameters. Matlab function linearize is used to obtain the LTI model
from the Simulink block diagram. This step assumes that the block diagram
represents a linear controller model. A systematic procedure can remove this
assumption: one can check whether a given Simulink block diagram is linear
(i.e., both additive and homogeneous) using Simulink Design Verifier [75],
a model checker for Simulink. For example, to check if a controller block
in Simulink is additive or not, as shown in Figure 6.2, one can create two
additional duplicates of the controller block, generate two different input se-
quences, and check if the output of the controller in response to the sum of
two inputs is equal to the sum of two outputs of the controllers in response
the two inputs respectively. In Figure 6.2, controller wrapper wraps the
actual controller under test, and internally performs multiplexing and de-
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multiplexing to handle the multiple inputs and outputs of the controller.
Simulink Design Verifier serves checking if this holds for all possible input
sequences. However, a limitation of the current version of Simulink Design
Verifier is that it does not support all Simulink blocks and does not properly
handle non-linear cases. In these cases, alternatively, one can validate the
linearity of controllers using simulation-based tests instead of model check-
ing, which can be systematically done by Simulink Test [76]. This method
is not limited by any types of Simulink blocks, and can effectively disprove
the linearity of controllers for non-linear cases. However, this alternative
method may not be as rigorous as the model-checking based method because
the simulation-based test does not consider all possible input cases.
The next step is extracting the LTI model from the controller implemen-
tation C code. To do this, LCV uses the symbolic execution technique which
allows us to identify the computation of the step function (i.e., C function
which implements the controller). By the computation, we mean the big-step
transition relation on global states between before and after the execution
of the step function. The big-step transition relation is represented as sym-
bolic formulas that describe how global variables for the controller’s state
and output are updated in terms of the old values of the global variables
as the effect of the step function execution. From the transition relation,
an LTI model for the controller implementation is extracted as explained in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. LCV employs the off-the-shelf symbolic execution
tool PathCrawler [83], which outputs in an XML format the symbolic execu-
tion paths and the path conditions of a given C program. The idea behind
this symbolic execution step is that linear controller codes used for embed-
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ded systems generally have simple control flows for the sake of deterministic
real-time behaviors (e.g., fixed upper bound of loops).
Finally, LCV performs the input-output equivalence checking between the
LTI model obtained from the block diagram and the LTI model extracted
from the C code implementation. We assume that a proper tolerance thresh-
old is given by a control engineer as a result of robustness analysis. To do the
input-output equivalence checking, we employ the notion of similarity trans-
formation [64], which implies that two minimal LTI models are input-output
equivalent if and only if they are similar to each other (i.e., there exists a sim-
ilarity transformation matrix T that satisfies certain conditions). Thus, we
first minimize both the extracted model and the original model via Kalman
Decomposition [64] (Matlab function minreal). The input-output equiva-
lence checking problem is reduced to the problem of finding the existence of
T (i.e., similarity checking problem). LCV formulates the similarity checking
problem as a convex optimization problem [60], and employs CVX [40] to find
T . In the formulation, the equality relation is relaxed to tolerate the numer-
ical errors that come from multiple sources (e.g., the controller parameters,
the computation of the implementation, the verification process) so that any
two quantities which are closer than a given  are considered to be equal.  is
chosen to be 10−5 for the case study that we performed in the next section.
The output of LCV is as follows: First of all, when LCV fails to extract
an LTI model from code, it tells the reason (e.g., non-deterministic execu-
tion paths for a symbolic input due to branching over a symbolic expression
condition, non-linear arithmetic computation due to the use of trigonometric
functions). Moreover, for the case of non-equivalent model and code, LCV
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provides the LTI models obtained from the Simulink block diagram model
and the C code respectively, so that the user can simulate both of the models
and easily find an input sequence that leads to a discrepancy between their
output behaviors. Finally, for the case of equivalent model and code, LCV
additionally provides a similarity transformation matrix between the two
LTI models, which is the key evidence to prove the input-output equivalence
between the model and code.
6.2 Evaluation
We evaluate LCV through conducting a case study using a standard PID
controller and a controller used in a quadrotor. We also evaluate the scala-
bility of LCV in the subsequent subsection. The instruction and software of
LCV are available online for evaluation2, which contains all of the files used
for the evaluation of the tool in this section (i.e., Simulink block diagram and
C code implementation).
6.2.1 Case Study
PID Controller
In our case study, we first consider a proportional-integral-derivative (PID)
controller, which is a closed-loop feedback controller commonly used in var-
ious control systems (e.g., industrial control systems, robotics, automotive).
A PID controller attempts to minimize the error value et over time which is
defined as the difference between a reference point rt (i.e., desired value) and
a measurement value yt (i.e., et = rt − yt). To do this, the PID controller
2http://cis.upenn.edu/~park11/lcv.html
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Figure 6.3: The block diagram of the PID controller.
adjusts a control input ut computing the sum of the proportion term kpet,
integral term kiT
∑t
i=1 et and derivative term kd
et−et−1
T
so that
ut = kpet + kiT
t∑
i=1
et + kd
et − et−1
T
. (6.2)
where kp, ki and kd are gain constants for the corresponding term, and T
is the sampling time. Fig. 6.3 shows the Simulink block diagram for the
PID controller, where the gain constants are defined as kp = 9.4514, ki =
0.69006, kd = 2.8454, and the sampling period is 0.2 s.
For the PID controller model, we check four different versions of imple-
mentations such as PID1, PID2, PID3 and PID3’. PID1 is obtained by code
generation from the model using Embedded Coder. PID2 is obtained from
PID1 by a manual transformation to improve the numerical accuracy (using
the first transformation technique presented in [23]). In a similar way, PID3
is obtained by the transformation from PID1 for an even better numerical
accuracy (following the optimization procedure and the output pseudo code
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of Listing 3 in [23]). However, the output code has an unintended bug by
mistake that has been confirmed by the authors of the paper (i.e., variable
s is not computed correctly, and the integral term is redundantly added to
the output), which makes PID3 incorrect. PID3’ is an implementation that
corrects PID3. Using LCV, we can verify that PID1, PID2 and PID3’ are
correct implementations, but PID3 is not (see Listing 6 in Appendix B).
Moreover, we check yet another version of implementation PID4. PID4 is
obtained by injecting a known bug of Embedded Coder into the implemen-
tation PID1. The bug with ID of 1658667 [71] that exists in the Embedded
Coder version from 2015a through 2017b (7 consecutive versions) causes the
generated code to have state variable declarations in a wrong scope. The
state variables which are affected by the bug are mistakenly declared as local
variables inside the step function instead of being declared as global vari-
ables. Thus, those state variables affected by the bug are unable to preserve
their values throughout the consecutive step function executions. LCV can
successfully detect the injected bug by identifying that the extracted model
from the controller code does not match with the original controller model.
Quadrotor Controller
The second and more complex application in our case study is a controller
of the quadrotor called Erle-Copter. The quadrotor controller controls the
quadrotor to be in certain desired angles in roll, yaw and pitch. The quadro-
tor uses the controller software from the open source project Ardupilot3.
Inspired by the controller software, we obtained the Simulink block diagram
3http://ardupilot.org/
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Figure 6.4: Our quadrotor platform (Left). The quadrotor controller block
diagram (Right).
shown in Fig. 6.4. In the names of the inport blocks, the suffix d indicates
the desired angle, y, the measured angle, and rate y, the angular speed.
Each component of the coordinate of the quadrotor is separately controlled
by its own cascade PID controller [56]. A cascade of PID controller is a
sequential connection of two PID controllers such that one PID controller
controls the reference point of another. In Fig. 6.4, there are three cascade
controllers for the controls of roll, pitch and yaw. For example, for the roll
control, roll pid controls the angle of roll, while roll rate PID controls
the rate of roll using the output of roll PID as the reference point. The
sampling time T of each PID controller is 2.5 ms. This model uses the built-
in PID controller block of Simulink to enable the PID auto-tuning software
in Matlab (i.e, pidtune()). The required physical quantities for controlling
roll and pitch are identified by physical experiments [29]. We use Embedded
Coder to generate the controller code for the model, and verify that the gen-
erated controller code correctly implements the controller model using LCV
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The running time of LCV
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Figure 6.5: The running time of LCV for verifying controllers with dimension
n.
(see Listing 7 in Appendix B).
6.2.2 Scalability
To evaluate the scalability of LCV with a larger range of controller dimension
than what has been done in the previous chapters, we measure the running
time of LCV verifying the controllers of different dimensions (i.e., the size of
the LTI model) up to 50. We randomly generate LTI controller models using
Matlab function drss varying the controller dimension n from 2 to 50. The
range of controller sizes was chosen based on our observation of controller
systems in practice. We construct Simulink models with LTI system blocks
that contain the generated LTI models, and use Embedded Coder to generate
the implementations for the controllers. The running time of LCV for veri-
fying the controllers with different dimensions is presented in Fig. 6.5, which
shows that LCV is scalable for the realistic size of controller dimension.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary of this Dissertation
In conclusion, this dissertation addressed the problem of verifying linear con-
troller software against its mathematical model in the absence of verified code
generator in the model-based development. We developed an automatic ver-
ification tool to ensure the conformance between a step function C code and
an LTI controller model from the input-output perspective with tolerance
up to a given threshold. To develop LCV, we explored and proposed the
approaches presented in Chapter 3 through Chapter 6.
In Chapter 3, we proposed to use invariants based on transfer functions, a
well-known concept in the linear systems theory, since it allows us to accom-
modate optimizations in the state representation that could be applied by
the code generator. We have demonstrated the feasibility of performing auto-
matic verification of such invariants on controllers with a realistic number of
states. We have studied both exact and inexact controller implementations;
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the latter may result from numerical manipulations within the code genera-
tor. For inexact implementations, the invariant incorporates error bounds on
the level of deviation from the transfer function. We evaluated our approach
on controller implementations, generated by Matlab for randomly generated
transfer functions. The evaluation also showed that scalability of verifica-
tion can be improved by using an alternative representation of the transfer
function.
In Chapter 4, we have proposed to use the symbolic execution technique to
reconstruct mathematical models from linear time-invariant controller imple-
mentations. We have presented a method to check input-output equivalence
between the specification model and the extracted model using the SMT for-
mulation and the convex optimization formulation. Through the evaluation
using randomly generated specification and code by Matlab, we showed that
the scalability of our new approach has significantly improved compared to
our own earlier work presented in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, we have presented an approach for the verification of finite
precision implementations of linear controllers against mathematical specifi-
cations. We have proposed to use a combination of techniques such as sym-
bolic execution and floating point error analysis in order to extract the quan-
tized controller model from finite precision linear controller implementations.
We have defined an approximate input-output equivalence relation between
the specification model (i.e., linear time-invariant model) and the extracted
model (i.e., quantized controller model), and presented a method to check the
approximate equivalence relation using the convex optimization formulation.
We have evaluated our approach using randomly generated controller specifi-
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cations and implementations by MATLAB/Simulink/Embedded Coder. The
evaluation result shows that our approach is scalable for the realistic con-
troller size, and the computational overhead to analyze the effect of floating-
point error is negligible compared to our own earlier work presented in Chap-
ter 4.
In Chapter 6, we have presented our tool LCV which verifies the equiva-
lence between a given Simulink block diagram and a given C implementation
from the input-output perspective. Through an evaluation, we have demon-
strated that LCV is applicable to the verification of a real-world system’s
controller and scalable for the realistic controller size. We also demonstrated
that LCV successfully detected certain known and unknown bugs of Embed-
ded Coder and Salsa which are unverified code generation and transformation
tools respectively which are used in the model-based development.
7.2 Future Research Direction
This dissertation has focused on linear controllers. A potential avenue of
future work is extending the method/tool of this dissertation for non-linear
controllers. This is motivated by the fact that Simuilnk provides a rich mod-
eling language which is capable to specify many different types of non-LTI
controllers. Although the class of LTI controllers are most commonly used
in control systems, there are far more controller classes which are not LTI.
However, we note that verification of certain types of non-linear controllers
may not be decidable. Thus, an interesting extension of our verification ap-
proaches to a class of non-LTI controllers may be considering switched LTI
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controllers [50]. A switched LTI controller consists of multiple sub-controllers
which are all LTI. These sub-controllers operate in parallel for the same in-
put signal, but only one sub-controller’s output is selected to be the actual
control output to the actuator of the system. The selection of output sig-
nal is dome by a separate component called ‘supervisor’ (or decision maker).
This class of controllers is a natural and interesting extension of LTI con-
trollers that can model certain adaptive controllers. In the verification of
this types of controllers implementations, we should be able to handle the
‘Switch’ block in the Simuilnk models and the conditional statement in the C
language as well as the supervisor components which are potentially defined
as state machines.
Another avenue of future work is finding the tolerance threshold values
from robustness analysis. There is an inherent discrepancy between controller
models and their implementation because not only do the implementations
use finite-precision arithmetic, but they also may be inexact due to the po-
tential rounding errors in the code generation/optimization process. Thus,
it is reasonable to allow a tolerance in the conformance verification as long
as the implementation has the same desired property to the model’s. In
our verification approaches presented in this thesis, we assumed that such a
tolerance threshold value (e.g., approximate equivalence tolerance) is given
by the control engineer as a result of robustness analysis. Thus, immediate
future work may include the development of a technique to obtain a proper
tolerance threshold value for the verification of a given controller building
upon the existing robust control analysis techniques [32, 5, 82].
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Appendix A
Step function example
typedef double real_T;
typedef int int_T;
typedef char char_T;
typedef struct tag_RTM_LTIS_T RT_MODEL_LTIS_T;
typedef struct {
real_T Internal_DSTATE[5];
} DW_LTIS_T;
typedef struct {
real_T Internal_C[10];
} ConstP_LTIS_T;
typedef struct {
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real_T u[2];
} ExtU_LTIS_T;
typedef struct {
real_T y[2];
} ExtY_LTIS_T;
struct tag_RTM_LTIS_T {
const char_T * volatile errorStatus;
};
extern DW_LTIS_T LTIS_DW;
extern ExtU_LTIS_T LTIS_U;
extern ExtY_LTIS_T LTIS_Y;
extern const ConstP_LTIS_T LTIS_ConstP;
extern void LTIS_initialize(void);
extern void LTIS_step(void);
extern void LTIS_terminate(void);
extern RT_MODEL_LTIS_T *const LTIS_M;
const ConstP_LTIS_T LTIS_ConstP = {
{ -0.793176, 0.154365, -0.377883, -0.360608, -0.142123,
0.503767, -0.573538, 0.170245, -0.583312, -0.56603 }
};
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DW_LTIS_T LTIS_DW;
ExtU_LTIS_T LTIS_U;
ExtY_LTIS_T LTIS_Y;
RT_MODEL_LTIS_T LTIS_M_;
RT_MODEL_LTIS_T *const LTIS_M = &LTIS_M_;
void LTIS_step(void)
{
{
{
static const int_T colCidxRow0[5] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 };
const int_T *pCidx = &colCidxRow0[0];
const real_T *pC0 = LTIS_ConstP.Internal_C;
const real_T *xd = &LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[0];
real_T *y0 = &LTIS_Y.y[0];
int_T numNonZero = 4;
*y0 = (*pC0++) * xd[*pCidx++];
while (numNonZero--) {
*y0 += (*pC0++) * xd[*pCidx++];
}
}
{
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static const int_T colCidxRow1[5] = { 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 };
const int_T *pCidx = &colCidxRow1[0];
const real_T *pC5 = &LTIS_ConstP.Internal_C[5];
const real_T *xd = &LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[0];
real_T *y1 = &LTIS_Y.y[1];
int_T numNonZero = 4;
*y1 = (*pC5++) * xd[*pCidx++];
while (numNonZero--) {
*y1 += (*pC5++) * xd[*pCidx++];
}
}
}
{
real_T xnew[5];
int_T i;
xnew[0] = (0.87224)*LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[0];
xnew[0] += (0.822174)*LTIS_U.u[0]+(-0.438008)*LTIS_U.u[1];
xnew[1] = (0.366378)*LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[1];
xnew[1] += (-0.278536)*LTIS_U.u[0]+(-0.824313)*LTIS_U.u[1];
xnew[2] = (-0.540795)*LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[2];
xnew[2] += (0.874484)*LTIS_U.u[0]+(0.858857)*LTIS_U.u[1];
xnew[3] = (-0.332664)*LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[3];
xnew[3] += (-0.117628)*LTIS_U.u[0]+(-0.506362)*LTIS_U.u[1];
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xnew[4] = (-0.204322)*LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[4];
xnew[4] += (-0.955459)*LTIS_U.u[0]+(-0.622498)*LTIS_U.u[1];
for(i=0; i<5; i++)
LTIS_DW.Internal_DSTATE[i] = xnew[i];
}
}
Listing 5: Step function example
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Appendix B
LCV output examples
------------------------
Verification parameters:
------------------------
Simulink model: dpid
Simulink block: dpid/dpid
C files:
'dpid0.c'
Step function: dpid0_step
Input variables:
'dpid0_U.r' 'dpid0_U.y'
Output variables:
'dpid0_Y.u'
Precision(epsilon): 1e-05
---------------------
Verification started.
---------------------
Obtaining M1(A1,B1,C1,D1), a LTI model from the Simulink block diagram ...
A1
1 0
105
0 0
B1
0.138012000000000 -0.138012000000000
14.226999999999999 -14.226999999999999
C1
1 -1
D1
23.816411999999996 -23.816411999999996
Extracting M2(A2,B2,C2,D2), a LTI model from the C code ...
A2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
B2
1.000000000000000 -1.000000000000000
0 0
0 0
0 0
1.000000000000000 -1.000000000000000
14.227000000000000 -14.227000000000000
0 0
C2
Columns 1 through 5
14.227000000000000 14.227000000000000 14.227000000000000 14.227000000000000 -0.138012000000000
Columns 6 through 7
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1.000000000000000 14.227000000000000
D2
38.043411999999996 -38.043411999999996
Checking the input-output equivalence ...
Minimizing M1 as M1'(A1',B1',C1',D1') ...
Minimizing M2 as M2'(A2',B2',C2',D2') ...
2 states removed.
Minimized models:
A1'
1 0
0 0
B1'
0.138012000000000 -0.138012000000000
14.226999999999999 -14.226999999999999
C1'
1 -1
D1'
23.816411999999996 -23.816411999999996
A2'
0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 0.707106781186547 0.000000000000000
1.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000
0.000000000000000 1.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000
0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000
0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000 1.000000000000000
B2'
0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000
-0.000000000000000 0.000000000000000
0.000000000000000 -0.000000000000000
1.414213562373095 -1.414213562373095
14.227000000000000 -14.227000000000000
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C2'
14.227000000000000 14.227000000000000 14.227000000000000 9.962418954855893 1.000000000000000
D2'
38.043411999999996 -38.043411999999996
Not equivalent (different dimension of minimized models) (2 ~= 5).
Elapsed time is 9.272016 seconds.
----------------------
Verification finished.
----------------------
Listing 6: Output of LCV for the PID3 example
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------------------------
Verification parameters:
------------------------
Simulink model: erle_copter
Simulink block: erle_copter/erle_copter_controller
C files:
'erle_copter_controller.c'
Step function: erle_copter_controller_step
Input variables:
Columns 1 through 2
'erle_copter_controller_U.thrust_d' 'erle_copter_controller_U.roll_d'
Columns 3 through 4
'erle_copter_controller_U.roll_y' 'erle_copter_controller_U.roll_rate_y'
Columns 5 through 6
'erle_copter_controller_U.pitch_d' 'erle_copter_controller_U.pitch_y'
Columns 7 through 8
'erle_copter_controller_U.pitch_rate_y' 'erle_copter_controller_U.yaw_d'
Columns 9 through 10
'erle_copter_controller_U.yaw_y' 'erle_copter_controller_U.yaw_rate_y'
Output variables:
Columns 1 through 2
'erle_copter_controller_Y.thrust_u' 'erle_copter_controller_Y.roll_rate_u'
Columns 3 through 4
'erle_copter_controller_Y.pitch_rate_u' 'erle_copter_controller_Y.yaw_rate_u'
109
Precision(epsilon): 1e-05
---------------------
Verification started.
---------------------
Obtaining M1(A1,B1,C1,D1), a LTI model from the Simulink block diagram ...
A1
1.0e+02 *
Columns 1 through 5
0.010000000000000 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0.000000542625838 -0.000000542625838 0.010000000000000 0 0
4.162826684542279 -4.162826684542278 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.010000000000000
0 0 0 0 0.000000259717051
0 0 0 0 4.160560411533799
Columns 6 through 7
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0.010000000000000 0
0 0
B1
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0.000000171758370 -0.000000171758370 0 0
0 0.006759018592030 -0.006759018592030 0 0
0 0.000000380868793 -0.000000380868793 -0.000000000542626 0
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0 2.921885886942280 -2.921885886942280 -0.004162826684542 0
0 0 0 0 0.000000000166662
0 0 0 0 0.000000000302153
0 0 0 0 0.004840360825814
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.000000000166662 0 0 0 0
-0.000000000302153 -0.000000000259717 0 0 0
-0.004840360825814 -0.004160560411534 0 0 0
C1
1.0e+02 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0 0 0 0
4.177534754781552 -4.177534754781552 0.010000000000000 -0.010000000000000 0
0 0 0 0 4.170735794301745
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 7
0 0
0 0
0.010000000000000 -0.010000000000000
0 0
D1
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0.000010000000000 0 0 0 0
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0 2.932209473801149 -2.932209473801149 -0.004177534754782 0
0 0 0 0 0.004852198780144
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.004852198780144 -0.004170735794302 0 0 0
0 0 0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000
Extracting M2(A2,B2,C2,D2), a LTI model from the C code ...
A2
1.0e+02 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0 0 0 0
0 0.010000000000000 0 0 0
-4.162826680000000 4.162826680000000 0 0 0
-0.000000540000000 0.000000540000000 0 0.010000000000000 0
0 0 0 0 0.010000000000000
0 0 0 0 4.160560410000000
0 0 0 0 0.000000260000000
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0.010000000000000 0 0 0
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0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.010000000000000 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Column 11
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.010000000000000
B2
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0.006759018590000 -0.006759018590000 0 0
0 0.000000171760000 -0.000000171760000 0 0
0 2.921885886960000 -2.921885886960000 -0.004162826680000 0
0 0.000000380870000 -0.000000380870000 -0.000000000540000 0
0 0 0 0 0.000000000170000
0 0 0 0 0.004840360830000
0 0 0 0 0.000000000300000
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
113
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.000000000170000 0 0 0 0
-0.004840360830000 -0.004160560410000 0 0 0
-0.000000000300000 -0.000000000260000 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
C2
1.0e+02 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0 0 0 0
-4.177534750000000 4.177534750000000 -0.010000000000000 0.010000000000000 0
0 0 0 0 4.170735790000000
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.010000000000000 0.010000000000000 0 0 0
0 0 -0.010000000000000 0.010000000000000 -0.010000000000000
Column 11
0
0
0
0.010000000000000
D2
1.0e+05 *
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Columns 1 through 5
0.000010000000000 0 0 0 0
0 2.932209473820000 -2.932209473820000 -0.004177534750000 0
0 0 0 0 0.004852198780000
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.004852198780000 -0.004170735790000 0 0 0
0 0 0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000
Checking the input-output equivalence ...
Minimizing M1 as M1'(A1',B1',C1',D1') ...
4 states removed.
Minimizing M2 as M2'(A2',B2',C2',D2') ...
8 states removed.
Minimized models:
A1'
1.0e+02 *
0.000000553104392 0.000000000000110 -0.000000000000072
-0.053294848472191 -0.000000010572831 0.000000006946340
4.162485496370146 0.000000825769400 -0.000000542529747
B1'
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 -0.006758630368344 0.006758630368344 -0.000000000553104 -0.000000000952093
0 -0.037407627962002 0.037407627962002 0.000053294848714 0.004839964128421
0 2.921646421271873 -2.921646421271873 -0.004162485515247 0.000061969021889
Columns 6 through 10
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0.000000000952093 0.000000000818377 0 0 0
-0.004839964128421 -0.004160219427973 0 0 0
-0.000061969021889 -0.000053265834612 0 0 0
C1'
1.0e+02 *
0 0 0
4.177534734505039 0.000128854363016 -0.009999723626231
0.000000001966988 -0.009999180438304 -0.000128025624779
0 0 0
D1'
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0.000010000000000 0 0 0 0
0 2.932209473801149 -2.932209473801149 -0.004177534754782 0
0 0 0 0 0.004852198780144
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.004852198780144 -0.004170735794302 0 0 0
0 0 0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000
A2'
1.0e+02 *
0.000000000033993 0.000446804329864 0.000000000057955
-0.000000000000041 -0.000000539991988 -0.000000000000070
0.000000315643503 4.162826637142502 0.000000539959925
B2'
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1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0 0.000313611216248 -0.000313611216248 -0.000000446804332 0.004840360802119
0 -0.006759397610099 0.006759397610099 0.000000000539992 -0.000000000366950
0 2.921885869253011 -2.921885869253011 -0.004162826656022 -0.000000519525398
Columns 6 through 10
-0.004840360802119 -0.004160560386035 0 0 0
0.000000000366950 0.000000000315414 0 0 0
0.000000519525398 0.000000446561089 0 0 0
C2'
1.0e+02 *
0 0 0
-0.000000756560691 4.177534732347563 -0.009999456777501
-0.009999999942204 0.000000000758104 0.000001073319564
0 0 0
D2'
1.0e+05 *
Columns 1 through 5
0.000010000000000 0 0 0 0
0 2.932209473820000 -2.932209473820000 -0.004177534750000 0
0 0 0 0 0.004852198780000
0 0 0 0 0
Columns 6 through 10
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
-0.004852198780000 -0.004170735790000 0 0 0
0 0 0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000 -0.000010000000000
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M1' and M2' are input-output equivalent.
Similarity transformation matrix T found with error bound 4.2483e-06:
-0.000000120860229 0.999999999995001 0.000000262597397
0.999916663315123 0.000000118167540 -0.012909885578054
0.012909885557525 0.000000213285385 0.999916665046047
Elapsed time is 14.326160 seconds.
----------------------
Verification finished.
----------------------
Listing 7: Output of LCV for the Erle Copter example
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